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President Fidel V. Ramos in his first State of the Nation address 
on July 27,1992, emphasized that the advancement of peace and 
reconciliation shall be among the priorities of his administration. 
Presently, the Government is holding peace negotiations with the 
Reform the Armed Forces Movement/Soldiers of the Filipino 
People/Young Officers Union (RAM/SFP/YOU) after both parties 
have signed a peace agreement on December 23,1992 to pave way 
for the peace process. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the crucial 
negotiating issues and positions to arrive at an educated estimate of 
what could derail the peace process and what could the government 
do about it. It will also attempt to determine the RAM/SFP/YOU 
intentions and probable courses of action during the peace process 
and to formulate the best possible courses of action the government 
panel may take in terms of issues to be raised, bargaining positions, 
negotiation procedures, and other related matters based on a set of 
negotiation guidelines. Lastly, the study will present possible 
scenarios anticipating the RAM/SFP/YOU likely courses of action 
and the recommended government countermoves. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Philippine history is replete with accounts of uprisings 
and rebellions triggered by tribal, religious, national and 
political discontent. After the last two decades of conflict, 
the Filipino people have suffered enough from the continuing 
armed and violent confrontations in many part of the country. 
Presently, there are three major rebel groups that are engaged 
in an armed struggle against the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines (GRP). The GRP is faced with dissent by; the 
ideological revolutionaries, the Communist Party of the 
Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front 
(CPP/NPA/NDF); the Muslim secessionists comprising the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF); and the military rebels, the 
Rebolusyonaryona Alyansana Makabansa (RAM, formerly the Reform 
the Armed Fnrr.es Movement WKawal na Sambavanana Pilipino (KSP, 
or Soldiers of the Filipino People)/Young Officers Union 
(YOU). 
Upon the assumption of Fidel V. Ramos to the presidency 
in 1992, he emphasized that the advancement of peace and 
reconciliation shall be the priorities of his administration. 
From 1973 to 1992, the armed conflicts resulted to the death 
of 55,471 soldiers, government officials, rebels and innocent 
civilians. Some 1.5 million people have experienced 
displacement and have been deprived of their sources of 
livelihood; children who died of diseases, were orphaned, and 
deprived of education because of the figthing. Furthermore, 
the government has had to spend billions of pesos in 
operations to maintain peace and order throughout the country 
under an environment of armed internal conflicts. Perhaps, if 
only half of this amount could have been spent on development 
and livelihood programs, the Philippines might be in a much 
better state today. As the armed confrontations rage on, 
attaining progress becomes an ever more difficult task. The 
Philippines will be doomed to poverty, and will forever be at 
the tailend of our fast-developing Asian neighbors. 
President Ramos signed Executive Order 19 on September 1, 
1992 creating the National Unification Commission (NUC) whose 
tasked was to "formulate and recommend, after consulting with 
the concerned sectors of society, to the President, a viable 
general amnesty and peace process that will lead to a just, 
comprehensive and lasting peace in the country." It is 
envisioned that the peace process will be aimed at peacefully 
resolving and ending the armed conflict, with neither blame 
nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned. 
This thesis will be centered on the peace negotiation 
between the GRP and the RAM/SFP/YOU. The study will analyze 
the crucial negotiation issues and positions to arrive at an 
educated estimate of what could derail the peace process and 
what the government, specifically the negotiating Team and the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), could do about it. It 
will also attempt to determine the RAM/SFP/YOU intentions and 
probable courses of actions during the peace process and to 
formulate the best possible courses of action the government 
negotiating panel may take in terms of issues to be raised, 
bargaining positions, negotiation procedures, and other 
related matters based on a set of negotiation guidelines and 
framework. Lastly, the study would draw possible scenarios 
that may take place during the peace process and shortly 
thereafter, anticipating the RAM/SFP/YOU likely courses of 
action and recommended government countermoves in each 
scenario. 
There is no doubt about the timeliness and usefulness of 
this study. Hopefully, this study will assist the government 
negotiating panel to have a better insight of the RAM/SFP/YOU 
position on basic issues it is expected to raise, its 
negotiating strategy and tactics, and the varied problems the 
government panel may encounter during the entire peace 
process. The study then will give the government panel sound 
basis in the formulation of its position, counterissues and 
courses of action to be taken. 

II.  THE EVOLUTION OP THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY 
A.  EARLY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 
In the remote past, there were crude military 
organizations. Their establishment came at a time when the 
early Filipinos bound themselves together and founded a system 
of community life. Filipinos lived in communities called 
barangays which they had to secure from external pressures. A 
barangay. a derivative of the Malayan word balangay meaning 
boat, consisted of tribal families numbering from thirty to 
one hundred.1 The barangay was ruled by a headman called 
datu. Barangays due to socio-economic necessity merged to form 
a larger community either by mutual agreement among the datus 
or by force. The most powerful or influential headman assumed 
leadership to the enlarged community. 
Archeological findings revealed a number of armaments and 
implements of war used by the early Filipinos. These consisted 
of crude stone arrowheads, cudgels, iron lances and stone and 
iron flints. The existence of these armaments indicates one 
conclusive fact; early Filipinos had an armed organization to 
protect themselves. The Filipino Muslims were the first to 
appreciate the importance of a strong military organization, 
and also the first to use a locally invented artillery piece 
called the lantaka. 
1
 Agoncillo,Teodoro A. & Guerrero, Milagros C. - History 
of the Filipino, R.P. Garcia Publishing Company, Quezon City, 
1973, pp. 45-46 
B.  RESISTANCE AGAINST SPANISH CONQUEST 
1. The Battle of Mactan 
The Spanish historian, Pigafetta, who accompanied 
Magellan in his epochal voyage, recorded March 16, 1521 as the 
date of discovery of the Philippines by the Spaniards.2 In 
their haste to impose control on all the natives, the 
Spaniards burned a village in a neighboring island where the 
native chief, Lapu-lapu, refused to submit to Spanish 
domination. Lapu-lapu was the first Filipino to lead an 
organized resistance against the Spaniards. 
When the Spaniards landed on Mactan Island, Lapu-lapu and 
his men despite limited weaponry as compared to the much 
better equipped Spanish forces under Magellan, were able to 
overwhelm them. At close quarters, the native warriors slashed 
the necks, elbows, and legs of the Spanish soldiers, killing 
many of them including Magellan.3 
2. Early Filipino Revolts 
Suppression of native ideas and activities had been the 
hallmark of the Spanish rule in the Philippines. As a 
consequence, the Filipinos became wholly dominated by their 
conquerors. The only exceptions were the native Filipino 
Muslims who were never conquered by Spanish arms. The Spanish 
colonial officials issued oppressive policies which aroused 
hatred and developed a rebellious spirit among the Filipinos. 
The series of revolts that followed were caused by: taxes, 
imposition of forced labor, abuses and corruption, and 
arrogance and racial discrimination showed by the Spaniards 4 
2
 Dolan, Ronald - Philippines. A Country Study (4th Ed) , 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, p.5. 
3
 Karnow, Stanley - In Our Image. America's Empire in the 
Philippines. Random House, NY, 1989, pp.36-37. 
4
 Kessler, Richard J. - Suppression in the Philippines. 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989, p.7. 
The first of these revolts was led by Lakandula, the 
Chief of Tondo, and Soliman, his nephew and the Chief of Pasig 
against Legaspi in 1574. In their attempt to regain back the 
power they lost when the Spaniards landed in Manila in 1572, 
they attacked the Spanish garrison, the result of which was a 
devastating failure. Soliman's death during the fight ended 
the first Filipino revolt against Spain. 
In 1621, Tamblot, a native priest or babaylan, rose to 
prominence when he led about 2,000 Boholanos in an uprising. 
He announced to the people of Bohol that "the time has come 
when they would throw off the oppression of the Castilians; 
for they were assured of the aid of their ancestors and 
deviates or gods".5 Another Filipino leader, Juan Sumuroy, 
rose to prominence in 1649 when he organized an army composed 
of natives of Samar. His uprising was the result of an order 
issued by the Governor requiring the conscription of labor 
from the Visayas to the Cavite shipyards. Also, in 1639, the 
Cagayan insurrection was brought about by the cruelty of 
Spanish officials and the oppressive practices of the Spanish 
soldiers. 
C.  THE SPANISH COLONIAL ARMY 
During the entire Spanish regime, the Spaniards used 
Filipinos to fight for them in most, if not all, of their wars 
and campaigns in the island. Whether the enemy was a foreign 
force or Filipinos themselves, historical records reveal that 
there were always Filipinos on the side of the Spaniards. 
In the barangays, the Filipinos lost their incentive to 
maintain their closely knit military organization. This was 
due to the fact that the security and protection of their 
communities had been wrested by the Spanish Army and the 
5
  Baclagon,  Uldarico  S.  -  Philippine  Campaigns 
Philippine Army Press, Makati, 1990, p.6. 
Guardia Civil. This was prompted not by their loyalty to the 
Spanish throne, but by their wish to enjoy certain privileges 
such as, exemptions from forced labor and exemptions on the 
payment of taxes. However, when the Filipino revolts started 
to occur, some of them deserted to join the military rebels. 
The Spaniards, due to their meager number of troops in 
the Philippines, were forced to employ Filipinos in their 
armed service and relieve themselves of military service. They 
organized Filipino companies, assigned company colors, and 
train them how to fight in the manner that the Spanish Army 
would conduct themselves. Their strength varies accordingly 
as to the demand of the situation. 
During the final decades of Spanish rule, the Spanish 
military system was small and mixed. The army and navy forces 
utilized native Spaniards, other European nationals and 
Filipinos. The Guardia Civil, the infamous security police 
force which was organized in 1868, is a separate unit and is 
officered and manned by Spanish army regulars with some 
Europeans and a few Filipinos. These military forces were 
typical colonial armies serving colonial purposes: garrison 
duty, defense against foreign invaders, maintenance of peace 
and order, and detecting and suppressing insurrections.6 
As the wave of nationalism in the 1890's began sweeping 
the country, the Spaniards, further distrusting the Filipino 
enlisted men, dropped the number of Filipinos on the service, 
while increasing the number of Spaniards. 
D.  THE RISE OF PHILIPPINE NATIONALISM 
As early as 1892, the campaign for reforms spawned by the 
propaganda movement fomented several wealthy, patriotic 
Filipinos among whom were Dr. Jose Rizal, Pedro A. Paterno and 
6
 Jose, Ricardo Trota - The Philippine Armv 1935-1942 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 1992, p.9. 
Marcelo H. del Pilar; residing in Spain showed signs of 
failure.7 At the same time, a strong Filipino middle class 
was gradually emerging in the national scene. Only a few in 
this social structure held the conviction that the reforms 
prayed for could still be granted. The early Filipino leaders 
were not for separation from Spain. They were simply asking 
for reforms which were; changing the form of government from 
military to civilian, recalling the friars and the 
secularization of the parishes, representation of Filipinos at 
the Spanish Cortes, and equal treatment of the law before the 
courts of justice.8 In line with this thinking, the middle 
class, under the aegis of a strong-willed national leader, 
continued the struggle for a better colonial administration. 
This lasted until 1896. 
1.  The Katipunan 
On July 7, 1892, Andres Bonifacio, a member of the 
working class, founded a revolutionary movement known as the 
Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People 
(Kataastaasana Kaaalanaaalana Katipunan na maa Anak na Bavan) 
or Katipunan . 9 The fundamental objectives setforth were; to 
teach the ideals of patriotism and democracy, to foster the 
highest type of brotherhood among the members, and to promote 
chivalry and civic virtues for the glory of the Filipino 
race.10 
7
 Trask, David F. - The War with Spain in 1898. Macmillan 
Publishing Co. Inc., NY, 1981, p.392. 
8
 Baclagon. op. cit., p.37. 
9
 Wright, Martin - Revolution in the Philippines. A 
Keesing's Special Report. St. James Press, Chicago, 1988, p.4; 
Linn, Brian McAllister - The US Armv and Counterinsuraencv in 
the Philippine War. 1899-1902. University of North Carolina 
Press, 1987, p.4. 
10
 Zaide, Gregorio F. - History of the Katipunan. Loyal 
Press, Manila, 1939, p.4. 
The Katipunan is difficult to evaluate as a conventional 
military force because it was an underground revolutionary 
movement. Organization into regular military units does not 
seem to have been done. Instead regional units, largely 
dependent on the commander were utilized. Officers and 
non-commisioned officers were appointed on the basis of how 
many men they brought with them and on their pre-revolutionary- 
status.11 There was no central headquarters and coordinated 
action was difficult to accomplish although war plans had made 
provisions for setting up such headquarters in Los Banos, 
Laguna.12 Officers and men were all volunteers, at its peak, 
the Katipunan had some 30,000 men.13 Some of the officers had 
special skills which were utilized in building defense works 
or mobilizing men and materiel, but lack of tactical and 
strategic expertise, organization, discipline, training, as 
well as lack of arms and ammunition proved fatal. Bonifacio's 
men had to steal arms and ammunition from Spanish garrisons to 
augment their meager war assets. Their weaponry was mostly 
composed of sharpened bolos, spears, daggers and flints.14 
In August 1896, the Katipunan was compromised when the 
secret society's plan were betrayed to government authorities. 
With the Spaniards searching for him, Bonifacio fled Manila 
and on August 22 he declared the "Cry of Balintawak", which 
marked the beginning of the Filipino revolt against Spain.15 
While there were symphathetic outbreaks in the Tagalog 
regions, Bonifacio's call did not spark a national uprising. 
In the Ilocano and Bicol regions, the inhabitants, fearing 
11
 Kessler, op. cit., p.10. 
12
 Karnow. op. cit., p.73. 
13
 Agoncillo. op. cit., p.122 
14
 Karnow. op. cit., p.73. 
15
 Ibid. p.74. 
10 
Tagalog tyranny, aided the Spaniards.16 Most of the Spanish 
troops were deployed against the Moslems in Mindanao, thus 
could not prevent the rebels from contesting the provinces in 
central and southern Luzon. The Spaniards and their Filipino 
auxilliaries, having sensed the lack of unity among the 
insurgent military forces caused by factional quarrels, took 
the offensive in 1897, and with better arms and disciplined 
soldiers, they recaptured most revolutionary province and 
drove the insurgents to the hills. 
Bonifacio, unable to resolve the internal divisions and 
personality clashes in the movement, proved to be a poor field 
commander, and other military leaders soon emerged to 
challenge his authority. One of the most effective of these 
was Emilio Aguinaldo who gained prominence in August 1896 when 
he raided the Spanish barracks in Kawit, Cavite for guns and 
ammunition.17 When the revolt began, Aguinaldo formed a 
guerilla band, the Maadalo faction, assumed the title of 
general and soon controlled Cavite, the center of dissidence. 
Bonifacio, lacking military forces of his own, allied with the 
rival group, the Maadiwang faction. When the two factions 
agreed to merge during the Tejeros Convention held on March 
22, 1897, Bonifacio was deposed as leader of the Katipunan. He 
refused to accept his demotion, and after an abortive coup, he 
was arrested, summarily tried and executed by the followers of 
Aguinaldo on May 1897.18 The members of the Magdalo and 
Magdiwang factions decided to dissolve the Katipunan and 
establish a republic, complete with an army. Aguinaldo 
proposed the formation of a republican government and the 
16
 Linn. op. cit., p.4. 
17
 Kessler, op. cit., p.10; Trask. op. cit., p.395; 
Bernstein, David - The Philippine Story. Farrow, Straus and 
Co. NY, 1947, p.6. 
18 Kessler, op. cit., p.10; Trask. op. cit., p.93. 
11 
organization of a regular army; three corps of 10,000 men 
each, under the command of three generals and a general chief. 
Artemio Ricarte, former school master in Cavite, was elected 
captain general of the Filipino Army, a rank which corresponds 
to the present chief of staff. 
While the Tejeros Convention is today credited by the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines as the establishment date of 
the Philippine Army, it also marked a crucial and 
irreconcialable split between the Aguinaldo and Bonifacio 
factions which hastened the defeat of the Katipunan and the 
short lived Republic. The split of the movement enabled the 
Spaniards to regain the military initiative and trap the 
revolutionaries in the mountains where Aguinaldo would later 
offer to recognize Spanish rule under certain conditions. The 
Spanish authorities negotiated and concluded an armistice with 
Aguinaldo which was known as the "Pact of Biak-na-Bato». Among 
the provisions were the following:19 
a. Cessation of hostilities with the revolutionary 
leaders who agree to live in voluntary exile to 
Hongkong. 
b. Grant of general amnesty to those who would lay down 
their arms. 
c Spain to pay an indemnity of 800,000 pesos to the 
uprising Filipinos and 900,000 pesos to Filipino 
families who had suffered as a consequence of the 
hostilities. 
There was general peace in the country after the signing 
of the "Pact of Biak-na-Bato." Aguinaldo with 400,000 check in 
his possession, and the other revolutionary leaders boarded a 




2.  The Army of the Liberation of the Philippines 
Among Aguinaldo's first acts upon returning from exile in 
May 19,189 8 was to rally Filipinos to the cause of 
independence. Learning from the mistakes of the Katipunan, 
Aguinaldo realized that an army had to be organized as soon as 
possible, that resources had to be maximized and leaders 
appointed. Due to the exigencies of that time, it had to be a 
volunteer army. It was called the Army of Liberation of the 
Philippines.20 
On June 23,1898 Aguinaldo created a revolutionary 
government wherein he formed a department of War and Public 
Works, under which the army was placed, and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, under which the navy was placed. Baldomero 
Aguinaldo was named secretary of war and public works and 
Antonio Luna, as director of war. The army was organized in 
conformity of the modern armies of that time. It was to have 
the standard military arms and branches: infantry, artilley, 
cavalry, engineers and a general staff. The basic organization 
was regional and each province was under a provincial military 
commander. The provincial commanders were charged with the 
raising of army units and the subsistence and clothing of the 
troops. Because of this territorial mobilization of the 
forces, the units came to be known by the province they came 
from, such as "Cavite Battalion" or "Bulacan Battalion". The 
revolutionary government had no problem in acquiring any 
number of volunteers it wanted for military service. Due to 
the total absence of any roster or returns it was never 
ascertained how many Filipinos were actually mobilized. 
With the organization of the revolutionary army, 
acquisition of arms had to be addressed. On May 27,1898 a 
shipment from Amoy arrived with 2,282 Remington rifles and 
20
 Jose. op. cit., p.10. 
21
 Baclagon. op. cit., p.70 
13 
176,550 cartridges.22 Consul General Rounseville Wildman, 
American consul in the Hongkong, made this purchase with 
50,000 Mexican pesos provided by Aguinaldo. He also arranged 
for a second shipment, expending 67,000 pesos but it was never 
delivered to the insurgents; no one has ever explained the 
disposition of payment. The insurgents also sought arms in 
Japan but the vessel carrying these cargo encountered a 
violent typhoon off Formosa and went to bottom. 
E.  END OF INSURRECTION 
1.  The Capture of Aguinaldo 
On March 23, 1901, Colonel Frederick Funston captured 
Aguinaldo by a daring ruse. Posing as prisoners, he and three 
of his officers were marched to Aguinaldo's headquarters in 
Palanan, Isabela, by a detachment of Macabebe scouts led by 
Cecilio Segismundo, masquerading as "insurrectos", and there 
arrested him. With the capture of Aguinaldo, the back of the 
insurrection had been broken, but much remained to be 
accomplished. 
General Arthur MacArthur took drastic steps to curve out 
the insurrection. With infinite patience, he offered an olive 
branch and conveyed to the proud and sensitive Filipinos the 
fact that armed resistance was futile, but that generous mercy 
and a better life followed acquiescence. With this action, he 
became to the Filipino people a symbol of justice and fair 
play.23 The Philippine Insurrection was ended by the 
presidential proclamation issued by President Theodore 
Roosevelt on July 4, 1901.24 After two years of insurrection, 
22 Trask. op. cit., p.405 
23
 Dupuy, Ernest  R.(Col) - The Compact History of the 
United States Army. Hawthorn Books Inc. NY, 1964, p.174. 
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4,230 Americans died with hundreds more later dying of 
disease, and more than 20,000 Filipinos had perished.25 
President Roosevelt hereafter proclaimed peace, amnesty to all 
Filipinos taking the oath of allegiance, and the establishment 
of civil government throughout the Christian-inhabited 
portions of the country. 
2. The Creation of the Philippine Constabulary 
As early as November 30, 1900, the Second Philippine 
Commision headed by William H. Taft, who later became the 
First Civil Governor during the American colonial government, 
recommended to the Secreatry of War, the organization of an 
Insular Constabulary.26 The Secretary of War approved the 
organization of a national police corps as recommended, and 
Organic Act No. 175 entitled "An Act Providing for the 
Organization of an Insular Constabulary, and the Inspection of 
the Municipal Police Forces" was passed by the Commission on 
July 18, 1901.27 The "Insular Constabulary" was later changed 
to "Philippine Constabulary" by virtue of Section 1 Act 255 on 
October 3, 1901.28 
Initially, the Insular Contabulary was composed and 
organized of the remnants of the Spanish Guardia Civil, 
established in 1898 from local levies to enforce the Spanish 
rule.29 The Philippine Constabulary  (PC)  was  initially 
25
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officered entirely by Americans and other Westerners until 
1907.30 It acquired a Filipino chief in 1917, and by 1933 
nearly all its officers were Filipinos. The roles and 
functions of the PC centered on the maintenance of peace and 
order, law enforcement, and protection of lives and properties 
of the people.31 Added to this, they likewise performed other 
public service roles, acting as jail guards, postmasters, game 
wardens, and telegraph repairmen.32 It could be surmised that 
the prime purpose of the Constabulary was not military but 
police duty. 
For the purpose of administering the PC affairs, the 
whole archipelago was divided into three districts. The number 
of districts was subsequently increased to five. Each district 
was under an assistant Chief of Constabulary who was vested 
with all the powers and prerogatives of the PC Chief. The 
initial recruitment and training of troops had no standard 
procedure. The troops had their training as they went about 
their usual business of chasing bandits and other lawless 
elements in the countryside. 
After several years of operations, the PC carved out a 
distinguish record of performance as embodied in a favorable 
report of PC Chief Brig. Gen. Allen to Washington which stated 
among other things, that the Filipino constables were 
"unquestionably more efficient than the Americans".33 The 
constables who demonstrated loyalty and deep devotion to duty 
were given the opportunity to qualify as officers of the PC. 




 Campos, op. cit., p.142 
32
 Dolan. op. cit., p.246. 
33
 History of the Philippine Army 1897-1945. Army 
Historical Division, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Manila, 
1981, p.66. 
16 
admitted to the PC School which was established in Sta. Lucia 
Barracks, Intramuros in 1905. After two years of study, they 
are qualified for call to active duty as commissioned 
officers. The opening of the school marked the beginning of 
the gradual "filipinization" of the Constabulary officer 
corps. In 1936 with the passage of the National Defense Act, 
the PC School rose to full college status and renamed 
Philippine Military Academy.34 It offers an academic 
curriculum of four years leading to a degree of bachelor of 
science. Graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants in 
the regular force. 
P.  THE COMMONWEALTH PERIOD 
1.  The Tydings-McDuffie Act 
In March 1934, the United States Congress passed the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act which spelled out in formal terms the 
Philippine independence. The Philippines was to become a 
self-governing Commonwealth under American auspices for ten 
years before achieving total independence.35 The outbreak of 
the Pacific War in December 1941 upset this calculation. 
The decision to grant independence was among the early 
moves of the first administration of a Democrat President, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The commonwealth would have its own 
constitution and would be self-governing, although foreign 
policy would still be the responsibility of the United States. 
Laws passed by the legislature concerning immigration, foreign 
trade and currency system needs approval of the President of 
the United States.36 A constitutional convention meeting in 
Manila in 1934-1935 framed a government with an executive, 
34
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legislative and judicial structure and later, in 1940, the 
Commission of Elections was created as an independent body to 
supervise the electoral contests scheduled every two years. 
Manuel L. Quezon was elected the first president of the 
Commonwealth. After his inauguration on November 15, 1935 he 
was faced with three basic problems, the solution of which 
would eventually lead to full political independence. These 
centered on political stability, national security and economy 
which had to be weaned away from American influence. He 
considered the problem of national security as an urgent one. 
President Quezon in his first address to the National 
Assembly during the inauguration of the Philippine 
Commonwealth said: 
Our program for national defense must serve notice 
to the world that citizens of these islands are not 
to be subjugated; that the conquest of this nation 
cannot accomplished short of destruction. 
He anchored his stand that a truly independent republic 
which would be set up at the expiration of the ten-year 
commonwealth period would need a military organization to 
protect the State from both its internal and external threats. 
In view of this, Quezon requested the US Government to make 
available to the Commonwealth the services of General Douglas 
MacArthur, whose term as Chief of Staff of the US Army was 
soon to expire, as Military Adviser and Chief of the 
Philippine Military Mission composed of US Army officers. This 
request was formally considered in as much as a previous 
legislation had been amended which authorized the detail of US 
Army officers to the Philippines.38 Immediately upon his 
arrival, Quezon conferred upon MacArthur the title of the 
37
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Field Marshall of the Army of the Philippines. Considering his 
dual status as an officer of both the United States Army and 
the Philippine Army, he retired from the US Army at the end of 
1937 and continued in the service of the Philippine Army, 
only, until he was recalled to US Army duty on July 
26,1941.39 
2.  The National Defense Act 
MacArthur drafted a defense plan which Quezon presented 
to the National Assembly and it became law on December 21, 
1935, known as Commonwealth Act No. 1 or the National Defense 
Act. The Philippine military would have two main components; 
the Regular and the Reserve Forces. The Regular Force would be 
made up of individuals who follow the profession of arms as a 
career, and who are constantly in the service of Government. 
The Reserve Force, on the other hand, would consist of those 
able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and 
fifty who have been duly trained for military. The Defense 
Act provided for an annual draft of 40,000 men, so that by 
independence in 1946, there would be force of 400,000. They 
were to receive five and half month's training, after which 
they would go into a "citizen reserve," and be recalled at the 
end of five years for a refresher course. As envisaged by 
MacArthur, the defense plan was patterned after the 
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On January 11, 1936, President Quezon through Executive 
Order 11 formally established the Philippine Army with the 
existing Philippine Constabulary as it nucleus.41 Jose de los 
Reyes, a retired colonel of the Philippine Constabulary was 
recalled to active duty and promoted to brogadier general and 
appointed as the first Acting Chief of Staff. Brig. Gen. 
Basilio Valdez and Col. Guillermo Francisco as the first and 
second Deputy Chief of Staff respectively. 
The Philippine Constabulary Air Group which was activated 
on January 2, 1935, was redesignated as Philippine Air Force 
on July 3, 1947.42 In 1939, an Off-Shore Patrol (OSP) was 
organized as a unit of the Philippine Army. In October 1947, 
the OSP was renamed Philippine Naval Patrol and on January 5, 
1951, it became the Philippine Navy.43 On December 23, 1950, 
President Elpidio Quirino issued Executive Order No. 389 
designating the four major services to compose the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Philippine Army (PA) 
became responsible for land defense, the Philippine Air Force 
(PAF) for air, the Philippine Navy (PN) for sea, and the 
Philippine Constabulary (PC) which, as the national police, 
was responsible for the security of rear areas in case of 
emergency.44 Providing the command over the major services 
was General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(GHQ,AFP). The Commander of the AFP was known as the Chief of 
Staff, AFP (CSAFP), who reported to the President as 
Commander-in-Chief,45 
41
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The organization of the regular force, development of 
military camps and build up of the reserve force were pursued 
vigorously. For purposes of administration, training and 
mobilization of manpower and resources, the Philippine was 
formed into ten territorial groups, each designated as a 
Military District. At least one division was organized in each 
of the ten Military Districts into which the Philippines was 
divided under pertinent provisions of the National Defense 
Act. The head of the Military District was a district 
commander who was responsible for the coordination of all 
activities relative to the preparedness within his 
jurisdiction. In time of war, he was responsible for the 
defense of his district subject to the control of the Chief of 
Staff, Philippine Army. 
The composition of the military districts, to include the 
reserve divisions assigned to them, was as follows:46 The 1st 
Military District, under the 11th Division located at Baguio 
City, Mt. Province covered the areas Abra, Batanes, Cagayan, 
Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Isabela and Mt. Province. The 2nd 
Military District under 21st Division at Tarlac, Tarlac 
covered La Union, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and Tarlac. The 3rd 
Military District under the 31st Division was based in San 
Fernando, Pampanga and covered Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga and 
Zambales. The 4th Military District covered Batangas, Cavite, 
Laguna, Mindoro, Palawan and Rizal under the 41st Division 
located at Lipa, Batangas. The 5th Military District under the 
51st Division was at Lucena, Quezon and covered Albay, 
Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Masdbate, Sorsogon, Tayabas 
and sub-province of Catanduanes. The 6th Military District 
with the 61st Division covered Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, 
Marinduque and Romblon. The 7th Military District under the 
46
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71st Division stationed in Bacolod, Negros Occidental covered 
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental and Siquijor. The 8th 
Military District covered Bohol and Cebu with the 81st 
Division based on Cebu, Cebu. The 9th Military District was at 
Tacloban, Leyte with the 91st Division which covered Leyte and 
Samar. The 10th Military District under the 101st Division 
located at Cagayan, Misamis Oriental covered agusan, Bukidnon, 
Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, 
Surigao, Sulu and Zamboanga. 
3.  The Philippine Scouts 
The Philippine Scouts (PS) was first formed on September 
4, 1899 in central Luzon to assist the US Army in its battles 
against Aguinaldo's forces.47 The Filipinos composed the 
enlisted ranks and the officers were American regulars.48 The 
Scouts, initially recruited as civilians, operated as guides, 
boatmen and occasionally fighters for the United States 
Volunteers.49 At first, higher headquarters was hesitant to 
arm Filipinos, in particular Macabebes, fearing disloyalty 
from and revenge by other Filipino regional groups in Luzon. 
The Macabebes comprised the first company of Philippine 
Scouts and were at first allowed to operate only within 
Pampanga. The "Macabebe Scouts" as they were initially called, 
was a tribe of blood thirsty mercenaries who had fought their 
brother Filipinos for Spain and now served America.50 They 
played a key role in the capture of Aguinaldo by having 
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assisted the American troops led by Colonel Frederick Funston. 
In February 1901 the United States Congress authorized 
President Theodore Roosevelt to enlist Filipinos in the United 
States Army.51 This act formally established the Philippine 
Scouts as a unit of the United States Army, following standard 
US Army Tables of Organization (TO) on company level and being 
paid as soldiers, but at levels below that of American 
servicemen. The rationale on this pay scale difference, 
wherein Filipinos received only half the pay of the regular 
American soldier was that Filipinos have a lower standard of 
living. 
A great number of Filipinos from the different regions 
and tribes volunteered to join the scouts and by July 1, 1901, 
they totaled thirty four companies. These units were not under 
a single scout headquarters, and operated independently under 
regional field commanders. Although the scouts were officially 
listed as civilian employees and paid as such initially, they 
were de facto soldiers with khaki uniforms and Springfield 
rifles, who fought battles in the front lines.52 Like the 
Macabebe scouts, many of the volunteers had served in the 
Spanish colonial army and had already received some military 
training; several had feared reprisal from the revolutionary 
forces for having sided with the Spaniards, and had felt it 
safer and more practical to join the US Forces. 
At the peak of the Filipino-American War, American 
soldiers reached a maximum of 71,528 in 1900.53 The Scouts 
fought in Batangas, Souther Luzon, Jolo, Laguna, Leyte and 
Mindanao. Although guerilla warfare still raged in the hills, 
the announcement of the end of the war on July 4, 1902  and 
51
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the return home of most of the US Volunteers lessened the need 
for military units in the Philippines.54 
Filipinos were given authority to study in West Point 
from 1908 on with one Filipino per class year, but the program 
then suffered from lack of interested and qualified 
applicants.55 Also, a number of Filipino scout officers were 
allowed in the late 1920's to attend to some US Army service 
schools for further training and for career advancement. 
G.  UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE FAR EAST (USAFFE) 
On July 26, 1941, General Douglas MacArthur was recalled 
to active duty and was appointed by President Roosevelt as 
Commanding General of all the United States Forces in the Far 
East (USAFFE).56 Invoking the provisions of the 
Tydings-McDuffie Law, President Roosevelt also called to 
active service all the organized military forces to include 
the Scouts and the Constabulary of the Philippine Commonwealth 
and ordered to merged with the US Army under the command of 
General MacArthur. 
When the national emergency developed, the training of 
reservist envisioned to form the "citizen army" was only 
half-way through in its implementation. By this time, the 
Philippine Army had in its roster of reservists no less than 
160,000 troops from whom were mobilized the men to constitute 
the ten reserve divisions that were mustered into the service 
of the USAFFE. The USAFFE consisted of the Philippine 
Department, Regular Army (US); the Philippine Division, 
Regular Army (composed of the Philippine Scout regiments and 
the American 31st Infantry); and the Philippine reserve 
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divisions.57 Later at the outbreak of the war, the 
Philippine Constabulary and the rest of the regular force of 
the Philippine Army, were absorbed into the USAFFE. 
Altogether, the force available for the defense of the 
Philippines totaled around 110,000 troops of which 85,000 were 
in Luzon.58 
The induction of the Filipino forces commenced on August 
15, 1941 with the Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC) earned the 
distinction of being the first unit of the Philippine Army to 
be integrated to the USAFFE. 
H.  POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY 
1.  The AFP and the Huk Insurgency 
The AFP, from its establishment until the early 1940's, 
was confined to its original functions of defending the state. 
But the absence of a viable and immediate external threat to 
the Philippines, the emergence of the Huk (Hukbo ng Bayan 
Laban sa Hapon or Hukbalahap, more commonly known as Huks) 
insurgency, the US defense umbrella in the Philippines and the 
larger Asian region led the AFP to assume a leading role in 
the peace and order drive of the country. 
In the late 1940's, the rise of the Huk insurgency 
necessitated the expansion of the role of the AFP beyond its 
primary functions. The Huks originated as a peasant-based 
movement pressing for agrarian reform. They fought the 
Japanese during the latter's occupation of the country, the 
end of the war found them heavily-armed and well-organized. 
The government did not recognize them as guerillas hence they 
were excluded from receiving pensions and other benefits. The 
Huks criticized the government's failure to initiate land 
reform that would correct the inequitable land distribution. 
57
 Baclagon. op. cit., p.134. 
58
 Baclagon. op. cit., p.135. 
25 
The AFP embarked on an extensive campaign to defeat the 
Huks. However, the strategy was not confined to armed combat. 
During the tenure of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National 
Defense, the strategy became a fusion of political, 
socio-economic, and military activities, thus signaling the 
start of the expansion of the military's protection, security, 
and peacekeeping functions. Magsaysay sought the assistance of 
Lt. Colonel Edward Lansdale, a military adviser attached to 
the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and also head of 
the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) clandestine and 
paramilitary operations in the country. In addressing the Huk 
problem, Magsaysay used two different approaches; a 
mailed-fist policy and a policy of attraction. A program of 
resettlement called Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) , thought 
of even before World War II, was turned into reality by 
Magsaysay. It became the government's response to the "land to 
the landless" slogan of the Huks. 
2. The AFP's Role in National Development 
The AFP also conducted socio-economic activities such as 
the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, school 
buildings and dams, in line with their counterinsurgency 
(COIN) program. When Magsaysay was elected President on 
December 1953, he continued the use of the military in the 
implementation of the socio-economic programs. During the 
incumbency of President Carlos Garcia after Magsaysay's death 
in 1957, the Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP) was 
adopted as a military responsibility. It aimed to use the 
personnel and equipment resources of the military in food 
production, rural development, land resettlement and public 
works construction. A number of SEMP settlements were 
established in Mindanao, Luzon, and Panay Islands. However, 
this endeavor was not undertaken at full scale and permanent 
basis. 
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President Diosdado Macapagal did not believe that the 
military's role should be extended to involvement in civic 
action, unlike Magsaysay and Garcia. He terminated the AFP 
civic action programs arguing that civic action encouraged the 
military to engage in politics. By 1965, there had been a 
substantial reduction in the AFP's presence in national life. 
The soldiers returned back to barracks and the regularity of 
military life. 
I.  MARCOS AND THE MILITARY 
1.  The Military in Philippine politics: an overview 
There is a consensus among students of post-war 
Philippine military, that up to 1972, the military 
establishment had not actively involved itself in Philippine 
politics and played an essentially non-political role.59 The 
military was accustomed to being non-partisan subordinate of 
successive civilian governments. Even during the incumbency of 
Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense and President of 
the republic, military support did not translate into 
political action straining either the principle of civilian 
supremacy or the notion of military professionalism.60 
Civilian control over the military was effectively shared by 
congress and the president. While the latter, as 
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, has primary control of 
the military operations, congressional control was also 
considerable. Congress defined military appropriations , 
passed on the promotions of officers to the rank of Colonel 
and above and conducted investigations when military 
59
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activities could be prejudicial to the public interest.61 
With the election of Ferdinand Marcos as President in 
1965 and up to the imposition of martial law, the military's 
traditional low profile and its non-participatory role in 
civilian functions changed. During this period, Marcos was 
instrumental in identifying roles for the military beyond the 
traditional ones of maintaining peace and order, defending the 
integrity of the national territory, and securing national 
sovereignty. He made the AFP an integral component of his 
economic development program. In his State of the Nation 
address, he emphasized that 
...the primary threat to our national security 
within the immediate future lies in internal 
subversion rather than external aggression. The 
military establishment will be developed along this 
basic premise in the years to come. However, since 
the development of our economy provides the 
permanent solution to this threat, I intend to 
harness to a greater extent the resources of our 
defense establishment in our task of nation 
building. It will be culpable negligence on our 
part if the peaceful uses of the military forces 
were not availed of to the fullest extent possible 
in our continuing program of economic 
development.62 
The Four-Year Economic Program formulated in 
September 22,1966 and approved by the National Economic 
Council noted that 
...the AFP with its manpower, material and 
equipment resources plus its organizational 
cohesiveness and discipline possesses a tremendous 
potential to participate in economic development 
which sjould be exploited to the maximum. Such 
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the problem besetting the country is socio-economic 
rather than military and that the resources 
available to solve this problem are scarce and 
limited.63 
The foregoing policy pronouncements provided the 
rationale for the AFP's massive participation in 
socio-economic development. On the basis of presidential 
delineations, the Philippine military was aptly described as 
a "catalyst of social change", a "training institution for 
national leaders", the "defender of the seat of government", 
a "nation builder", and a "model of national discipline and 
self-reliance".64 Marcos reversed the trend toward 
professionalism in the AFP. During his first thirteen months 
in power, he also served as the secretary of national defense 
at which time he supervised the largest personnel shake-up in 
the AFP's history.65 He reorganized the armed forces and 
rotated personnel to increase his personal control over the 
military.66 Key officers in the AFP heirarchy were retired 
and replaced by officers from his home province of Ilocos 
Norte. 
Southwest Command (SOWESCOM) was established on September 
1968 to attend to the increasing criminal activities such as 
smuggling, cattle-rustling, and the conflict between the 
Christians and the Muslims in Southern Philippines. It became 
the first unified command in the AFP which was composed of 
elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Constabulary. 
On May 1, 1976, SOWESCOM became Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 
with jurisdiction over the whole Southern Philippines and the 
responsibility of maintaining peace and order, assisting in 
63
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the socio-economic development in the area, and guarding it 
from external and internal threats.67 
The Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam (PHILCAG V) was 
the country's contribution to the Allied's efforts in the 
Vietnam conflict.68 PHILCAG V was involved in the 
construction and repair of roads, bridges, buildings, in the 
resettlement of the refugees, and in attending to the sick and 
the wounded from both sides of the battlefront in Vietnam. 
2.  Martial Law Period 
On September 21, 1972, President Marcos used his 
emergency powers to decree a state of full martial law 
througout the country. In an address to the nation, Marcos 
explained his action on the grounds that "our democracy, is 
endangered by the peril of overthrow".69 He further stressed 
that the government would now be able to undertake major drive 
against the communist insurgents and their supporters. Also at 
the same time, the government could implement the clean up of 
corrupt and sterile government officials, the initiation of 
land reform, the punishment of military personnel who had 
committed offenses against civilians and a radical reduction 
of the level of violence which had become endemic to Filipino 
society.70 Marcos further clarified that the proclamation of 
martial law was not amilitary takeover. The military 
authorities would only be implementing martial law to protect 
the country. 
Under martial law, the expansion of the military 
participation into civilian areas of operation was 
unprecedented in Philippine history. Military officials 
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assumed numerous previously civilian functions both on 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGO's).71 The 
record has moved a student of the Philippine military to 
remark: 
...Under martial law, the military became the 
primary basis of regime support as well as the 
partner of the martial law regime in implementing 
governmental policies. Soon after the proclamation 
of martial law, congress was disbanded, political 
parties were prescribed, the media was controlled 
and civil liberties were curtailed. In a country 
were no militaristic tradition where the military 
was traditionally low keyed and had a low profile, 
the military became visible, performing an expanded 
security and law and order role, greater management 
and administrative and developmental roles, and a 
new political role.72 
The "new political role" of the military was further 
elaborated as: 
...the most significant political role of the 
military since 1972 has to do with its replacement 
of the traditional politicians as dispensers of 
political patronage in the political system. 
Feeling the change in the distribution of political 
power, many petitioners transfered their locus of 
operations from the traditional politicians to the 
officer corps. 
...a number of officers also act as officials of 
certain political subdivisions (towns, 
sub-provunces, etc.) where internal security is 
minimal. Like the military PROD'S (Presidential 
Officers for Regional Development), they enjoy the 
executive and administrative powers within 
respective political subdivisions as well as 
political patronage and a political base.73 
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Apart from external defense, the AFP was also charged 
with the suppression of rebellion and the enforcement of all 
laws, decrees, orders, and regulations issued by Marcos. The 
agrarian reform law, by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 
27, was also implemented by the military, in particular, the 
Philippine Constabulary. The PC Provincial Commanders were 
authorized to receive sworn statements of landowners and 
submit same to the Secretary of National Defense. 
The military was also vested with judicial functions. The 
CSAFP was empowered to create military tribunals to try and 
decide cases of military personnel and other such cases as may 
be referred to them. These other cases included crimes against 
national security, violations of Anti-Subversion law and the 
laws of Espionage, crimes against public order, and crimes 
committed by public officials. By 1974, 20 military tribunals 
had been set up, however, on the later part of said year, 
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 237 ordered the return of many 
cases from the military tribunals to civilian courts. 
Peace and order problems continued to be the 
responsibility of the PC. In 1975, police forces were 
incorporated into the Integrated National Police (INP) and 
placed under the command of the PC Chief.74 These efforts may 
be viewed as an attempt to centralize political control by 
taking away a very important power from local governments. 
Likewise, the security role of the Presidential Security 
Command (PSC), whose initial responsibility was the security 
of the President and Malacanang, was expanded. The PSC was 
involved in intelligence work, since its commander, General 
Fabian Ver, was also head of the National Intelligence 
Security Agency (NICA) which was responsible for supervision 
and coordination of all intelligence services. 
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AFP units in the region were also unified in a composite 
force and this gave birth to the Regional Unified Command 
(RUC) . The RUC's were composite units where the PA, PN, PAF, 
and the PC were integrated under one command to facilitate 
better coordination of combat and support operations. It was 
contended that such centralization would result in efficient 
disaster control and relief operations, and greater 
responsiveness in civic action programs.75 
The military's dual role as the guardian of our national 
sovereignty and its increasing participation in civilian 
government has been attended by rapid growth in manpower and 
an impressive increase in its final outlay. The AFP has a 
total strenght of 58,000 men in 1971, grew to 67,000 in 1975 
and approximately 113,000 in 1982. Para-military forces are 
estimated at about 110,500. Reserve components of all services 
are reported to be about 124,000, bringing a total AFP 
strenght to 347,000 men. The national defense budget on the 
other hand, has increased from 367 million pesos in 1970 to 
8,212 million pesos in 1983.76 
3.  The Lifting of Martial Law 
Martial law was lifted in January 1981 by virtue of 
Proclamation 2045. Substantively, nothing had changed. The 
military's martial law roles and the machinery for their 
effective pursuit remained intact. Military tribunals 
continued to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving 
subversion. The military contonued to implement presidential 
orders and decrees and went on with its law and order 
functions such as suppression of strikes, rallies and 
demonstrations. The role expansion of the AFP enhanced its 
capacity to intervene directly in the political affairs of the 
country. Marcos used the military to enforce his orders and 
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decrees, and to perpetuate himself to power. He coddled his 
favorites in the military. Promotions and assignments 
continued to be his sole prerogative and personal loyalty 
became the primary criterion. Well-connected officers were 
able to place their people in key and juicy positions and even 
have their military services extended. The presence of 
extendee officers effectively blocked the promotions of 
middle-grade officers.77 Consequently, some officers became 
retirable at a fairly young age but at a fairly low ranks. A 
lot of officers were bypassed. A number of officers were 
promoted over several other more senior and qualified 
candidates. A breakdown in the merit system and demoralization 
became inevitable. 
In the field, the men in combat suffered losses not only 
because of inadequate training and shortage of equipment and 
supplies, but also because of lack of troops.78 The need for 
manpower resulted in mass enlistment and the transfer of men 
from desk job to combat. The concomitant result was that such 
troops fought against insurgents seasoned in guerilla warfare. 
In August 1983, General Ver was implicated in the 
assassination of Benigno Aquino.79 Marcos was forced to place 
Ver on a leave of absence while the investigation is going on. 
After being initially cleared by the Sandiganbayan, Ver 
immediately resumed his position as Chief of Staff. 
The assassination unleashed massive popular opposition to 
the Marcos regime and the military organization that sustained 
it. Aquino's martyrdom united the people and gave them courage 
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to openly oppose the dictatorship. It became clear that the 
military leadership was a willing tool to perpetuate the 
regime at all costs. 
Within the military,the assassination and the shame that 
attended it brought to fore latent dissatisfaction among some 
officers leading to the eventual movement of reform. The most 
prominent was the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) . The 
RAM's original activities as stated in their Manifesto would 
be geared towards the attainment of the AFP's new thrust of 
uplifting the morale and welfare of every man and woman in 
uniform, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the 
military establishment, and restoring the people's faith in 
the armed forces.80 The initial members were PMA classes of 
1971 to 1984, but its membership expanded to include retired 
alumni who voiced out publicity their sentiments while many 
active officers signified their support quietly. 
80 Kessler, op. cit., p.128. 
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III.  EMERGENCE OF THE REFORM THE ARMED FORCES 
MOVEMENT/SOLDIERS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE/YOUNG OFFICERS UNION 
(RAM/SFP/YOU). 
The assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. 
on August 21, 1983, triggered the severest political and 
economic crisis in the history of the Philippine republic. The 
immediate reaction was to demand the resignation of President 
Marcos. The assemblymen from the opposition party signed a 
resolution calling for the impeachment of Marcos on charges of 
"graft and corruption, culpable violation of the constitution, 
gross violation of his oath of office and other crimes." 81 
This was just brushed aside by Marcos and thrown out by the 
court. The United States since the murder of Aquino 
increasingly pressured Marcos to implement sweeping reforms to 
combat insurgency, rehabilitate the economy and restore 
democratic institutions. 
A.  THE REFORM THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (RAM) 
The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) started out as 
a loose group of military officers. Initially they were fondly 
referred as the Wednesday Club and later became the Thursday 
Club. These gatherings later turned into gripe sessions and 
eventually expanded to a larger group. On July 23, 1982, the 
REFORM (Restore Ethics, Fairmindedness, Order, Righteousness 
and Morale) the Armed Forces of the Philippines was born.82 
The organization of the RAM was a reaction to the widespread 
corruption in the ranks, favoritism in farming out promotions, 
babying of long retireable generals which stunted their own 
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career, rampant abuses against civilians, discrimination in 
the use of supplies, and the use of military units and 
paramilitary units to thwart the national will of the during 
elections.83 
The founding members of the movement were Brig. Gen. 
Eugene Ocampo, Colonel Gregorio Honasan, Colonel Victor Batac 
and Lt. Diosdado Valeroso to name a few.84 During the next 
couple of years, the RAM established linkages with other units 
in the armed forces through the conduct of information 
campaigns and informal talks to the officers and men in its 
effort to expand its membership. It grew to an estimated 
strength of 1,500 officers of a total 13,000-man officer 
corps.85 Majority of the movement's members were PMA 
graduates from the class of 1971 through the present.86 
Other groups nationwide were organized to spread the 
gospel of reforms until a ripple effect was achieved. RAM 
members traveled to the different military units of all the 
provinces and dialogued with any number of their comrade in 
arms who cared to listen. Each time they completed their 
mission, they received positive reports especially from among 
the junior officers, indicating the success of the movement. 
The task was formidable considering that the training of 
soldiers compels them "to obey first and complain later". The 
reformists found some difficulty to make their target 
audience, the rank and file, make them understand the nation 
they were defending with their lives was moving to an 
undesirable direction, and that they were being used to 
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promote personal rather than national interest. Added to this, 
a search for leaders of the small group was launched from 
among the more senior, only to find out from them a common 
reticence to lead. They were either too high to be 
non-partisan, too comfortable to be interested, or too wealthy 
to care. 
On February 17,1985, the RAM came out with its 
preliminary statement of aspirations embodying their ideals 
and later on March 15,1985 a statement of common aspirations 
which lay the movement's reformist guidelines in seeking an 
"effective and efficient and fairminded armed forces in the 
service of country and people."87 The RAM basic aim was to 
establish a unique martial tradition for the nation which 
envisages that "in the event that the movement is compelled to 
intervene in the political life of the nation in order to save 
it, the members pledge to each other that they shall return to 
barracks as soon as the sovereign will of the people has 
prevailed." The movement sought measures to prevent rifts in 
the AFP, weed out corrupt and banish "undesirables". One major 
gripe of the reformists was the bad image given to the 
military by "undesirable" officers and men who carried out 
abuses among the civilian population, misused equipment for 
their own personal needs, used their position for financial 
gain and take part in criminal activities.88 It also wanted 
to improve training, education, equipment and more efficient 
dispersement of logistical supplies to troops in the field. 
Promotions and rewards should solely be on the basis of merit. 
The overall sum was to improve the morale of a military which 
had become largely alienated from the people, particularly in 
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The first public appearance of the RAM was on March 
21,1985, at the Philippine Military Alumni homecoming day in 
Baguio City which coincided with the Academy's graduation 
exercises for Class 1985, wherein 300 members demonstrated in 
front of the graduating class and guests, including President 
Marcos, who was the traditional keynote speaker at the 
commencement rites and other senior officers of the AFP 
heirarchy. The Reformists sported T-shirts with the legend "We 
Belong...(short for the groups name- We belong to the Reform 
the Armed Forces Movement), and waved banners and placards 
demanding reform in the military organization.89 The reforms 
they asked for were focused on the military establishment 
only. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Acting Chief of 
Staff Lt. Gen Fidel Ramos publicly endorsed the movement. A 
number of retired generals, including former chiefs of staff 
have since indicated their support.90 The Association of 
Generals and Flag Officers (AGFO) issued a statement signed by 
retired Brig. Gen. Albert Friedlander saying its members 
"appreciate and support the We Belong movement and express 
our deep admiration and commendation to this highly patriotic 
act."91 The core leaders of the Movement were military 
academy graduates. A study of PMA graduates before 1972 
revealed that cadets were more tolerant of political and 
social diversity, less conservative than other students, and 
even became less authoritative as they progressed in their 
academy life.92 These findings suggest at least one reason 
the graduates became leaders of the military reform movement 
because they were more attuned to social development. This can 
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also be the result of only having a single academy were all 
cadets were trained to be with the army, navy air force and 
the constabulary ( in 1991, Philippine National Police Academy 
was organized and presently conducts the training of 
constabulary/police officers), wherein graduates have 
developed a common bond and understanding, common ideals and 
aspirations, and common goals and objectives and that is love 
of god, duty and country. The common experiences and personal 
loyalties gave the movement an organizational cohesion 
although it lacked in numerical strenght as against those 
allied to Marcos. 
The Philippines being closely allied with the United 
States was closely monitored by the latter. The reform 
movement was actively encouraged by Pentagon in its growth. 
This was manifested when it was praised during the 
congressional hearing/testimony in 1985. The support of the 
United States is valuable to the cause of the movement. The 
RAM knew that to stage a successful overthrow of the Marcos 
regime, support not in terms of arms and munitions, but the 
need of US moral support and backing, there were already plans 
as early in the late of 1985 to overthrow Marcos, even if his 
eventual death was necessary. It was during this period that 
the Army organized a 600-man counter-coup force and threatened 
to arrest the members of the RAM movement.93 However, RAM's 
timetable was hastened when Marcos decided to call for a snap 
presidential election. 
If the RAM should succeed in its reformist mission, the 
AFP would be a more acceptable guardian of the people. If it 
managed to achieve its second more dangerous goal of 
safeguarding a democratic transition of power after Marcos, 
the AFP would have earned itself a permanent position on the 
Philippines political landscape. 
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B.  SNAP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
After two years of political and economic crisis, growing 
communist insurgency and pressure from allies, Marcos decided 
to put his 20-year old regime at risk by calling for a "snap' 
presidential election to be held on February 1986, in order to 
attain legitimacy and to strengthen his hold to the 
presidency. Marcos used the communist issue as his main 
campaign weapon, despite captured documents of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines plenum held on December 23, 1985 in 
Nueva Ecija revealed that the communist insurgents would 
boycott the elections.94 The communist strategy was to allow 
the election to go ahead, and assuming Marcos wins or forces 
himself to win, to prove to the opposition the futility of 
fighting Marcos via the election box. 
The role of the AFP in the polls was a crucial factor. 
The reaction of the military officers to the election result 
would be equally and perhaps ominously significant. Marcos' 
critics accused him of making the AFP his private army. He has 
gradually enhanced the armed forces status as a political 
force, and at the same time military officers   became 
factionalized. 
RAM launched, as its first major activity, the 
"Kamalayan'86" (or Conciousness '86) campaign for a clean, 
orderly, peaceful, and honest elections during the February 
1986 snap presidential elections. "Kamalayan" was conceived by 
Navy Captain Felix Turingan to mount a major information drive 
calling for public vigilance against election fraud and 
coercion. The Movement which then claimed 70% of the 
commissioned officers since 1972, intended to communicate to 
active servicemen the necessity of not interfering with the 
election process.  Its objectives were to build public 
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understanding of election issues, maximize voter registration 
and to urge people not to sell their votes.95 Among the 
planned activities were a series of prayer seminars around the 
country on the issues of the campaign and the conduct of the 
election.96 
The election was held on February 7,1986. President 
Marcos had as his running mate a veteran politician, a 
traditionalist, and an expert in the constitution, Senator 
Arturo Tolentino. The opposition on the other hand formed a 
coalition party and named as their standard bearer, Corazon 
Aquino, widow of the late Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Her 
running mate was the former Senator Salvador Laurel, also a 
member of the old Congress, a traditional politician who came 
from a political clan and whose father was the late President 
Jose Laurel. Members of the US Congress led by Senator Richard 
Lugar came to Manila to observe the election process. 
The results of the election "officially" showed that 
Marcos-Tolentino tandem won over the Aquino-Laurel team. The 
Aquino-Laurel ticket garnered more votes in the urban areas 
but when the votes from the different barrios and barangays 
came in, the Marcos-Tolentino ticket overcame such deficit and 
won by a small margin. However, based on the civilian-managed 
poll tally, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) 
which was pro-Aquino, showed the results otherwise. It was 
claimed that the people of Marcos manipulated some of the 
election returns from selected provinces all over the country. 
Election frauds and coercion were raised by the opposition 
against Marcos. Vote-buying and ballot snatching were the 
other issues exposed. Senator Lugar confirmed in his after 
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mission report to President Ronald Reagan that there were 
indeed election anomalies largely initiated by Marcos' 
party.97 He concluded that the election was tainted with 
fraud and that Marcos did not have the clear mandate of the 
people.98 
Prior to the official proclamation of the winners of the 
recently concluded presidential election by Congress, on 
February 22,1986, RAM leaders precipitated the revolt against 
Marcos. Defense Minister Enrile and LtGen. Ramos led the 
disintegration of military support for Marcos. 
C.  THE PEOPLE'S POWER (EDSA) REVOLUTION 
The so-called EDSA (acronym of Efifanio De Los Santos 
Avenue) Revolution lasted for four days of which the RAM led 
by Minister Enrile and LtGen Ramos and supported by the 
people's power and the Clergy resulted in the non-violent 
overthrow of Marcos. Initially, the plotters envisioned the 
formation of a junta composed of the cross-section of society 
which represented the labor, business, clergy, judiciary, 
military and the professional sectors to run the country until 
such time new elections could be held.99 Mrs. Aquino then 
had the support of an extraordinary coalition of forces 
ascended to the presidency. Never in the history of the 
Philippines that a lady president ruled the country and this 
was the first time that it happened. She had the support of 
NAMFREL, which was led by business executives and the Catholic 
clergy. It is worth to mention the critical role played by the 
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clergy during the four-day revolution. Led by Jaime Cardinal 
Sin, the archbishop of Manila, as a body the bishops called on 
the people to demonstrate their rejection of the official 
election count by engaging in non-violent disobedience. 
A total of 400,000 volunteers were mobilized to police the 
voting during the snap elections and found the official count 
in favor of Marcos patently and massively fraudulent.101 
The massive support for Mrs. Aquino was an indication of the 
confidence the Filipino people bestowed upon her. 
The RAM's role in EDSA in restoring democracy was seen in 
the positive light and enabled the military to gain legitimacy 
in the public eye. The people thought of the military before 
as the unwitting tool of Marcos and are controlled through the 
chain of command. The evidence appeared that the Filipino 
soldier also had some ideals and given the opportunity to 
express such ideals and aspirations, would follow the dictates 
of his own conscience. Thus, the action taken by some members 
of the military seeking reforms in government eventually 
caused Marcos's overthrow and ushered in a new era for the 
military in the Philippine society. 
D.  THE AQUINO REGIME (1986-1992) 
The Aquino administration embarked on a national goal of 
national reconciliation and unification. To start with, she 
and her cabinet and advisers set the task of political 
reconstitution, she disbanded key elements of the Marcos 
machine, including the Office of Media Affairs, the 
Presidential Security Command and the National Intelligence 
Security Authority.102 She retired extended generals and 
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other senior officers perceived to be Marcos loyalists were 
dismissed.103 Also, to meet her campaign pledge,she 
released all political prisoners, including founders of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and of its military 
arm, the New People's Army (NPA).104 
The military had also started its reforms. The new 
CSAFP, Gen. Ramos undertook a series of internal reforms 
designed to professionalize the renamed New Armed Forces of 
the Philippines, NAFP ( after one year, the military reverted 
back to its former name AFP). Military personnel assigned to 
positions outside the military were recalled, thus reducing 
the armed forces involvement in government. 
The 19 87 Philippine Constitution permanently bars 
retirement extensions, military service in civilian positions 
and the involvement of military personnel in politics. In 
response to the President's call for national reconciliation 
and unification, the armed forces revised its 
counterinsurgency concept and formulated a strategy under 
Letter of Instruction MAMAMAYAN (Pro-People).105 The 
strategy called for an hollistic approach in defeating 
insurgency, unlike during Marcos when the military solely was 
tasked to combat this threat. The military's role is to fight 
the armed component of the CPP while the other government 
agencies attend to the relocation and rehabilitation of rebel 
returnees. In essence, the military returned to their basic 
role of protector of the people and defender of the 
sovereignty of the state. 
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1.  Military Threats to Redemocratization 
The administration of Corazon Aquino, which RAM helped 
put into power, failed to institute the reforms it promised to 
deliver, thus military elements repeatedly rebelled. The 
military's commitment to civilian authority has always been 
questionable and has become more so given its profound 
involvement in government and economy during the martial law 
years. Aquino saw the military as a threat in her presidency. 
In her six years of governance, seven coups had been initiated 
but failed. RAM continued its struggle for social change 
through two major uprisings, the August 1987 and the December 
1989 coup d'etats. As early as July 1986, there were already 
growing controversies that surfaced between the government and 
the defense and military establishments. Enrile was against 
the release of the core leaders of the communist party. He 
maintained the principle that Jose Ma. Sison, the founder of 
the party, and his followers were not merely political 
dissenters but more so of being hard core ideologues. But due 
to Aquino's campaign pledge, and without taking into account 
the repercussions of such political move and also in the point 
of view of national security, all political detainees were 
released. Another facet of controversy was the appointment of 
left-leaning members of the Cabinet, such as Executive 
Secretary Joker Arroyo, Secretary Pimentel and Secretary 
Sanchez.106 The defense and military officials viewed this 
as a threat which might undermine their positions. 
Another controversial issue was the duration of the 
government initiated ceasefire with the CPP/NPA. Enrile 
demanded that there should be a specific time frame of the 
peace talks with the CPP/NPA and a definite duration of the 
ceasefire. The defense and military establishments wanted a 
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Short duration of the ceasefire and not six months as decided 
by Aquino. President Aquino still being critical to the 
military seemed to be lenient in dealing with the communists. 
The military pictured themselves fighting insurgency with 
their right hands tied behind their backs and only using the 
left to combat the insurgents. The insurgents were more 
benef itted in the reconciliation approach by Aquino because it 
gave them the opportune time to regroup and to rearm. 
During the period September to November 1986, there was 
a plot code named "God Save the Queen" aimed at eliminating 
the pro-communists members in government and having a Convenor 
Group to govern the country.107 The plotters believed that 
Aquino was a weak president. Her only qualification to power 
was the support of the people and the clergy and the symbol of 
bringing back freedom and democracy to the people. It was 
clear that Enrile was closely connected with the plotters. 
This plan was aborted when Aquino forced Enrile to resign as 
Minister of Defense after her military supporters informed her 
this report and could no longer ignore them. This marked also 
the break-up of the Enrile-Ramos faction. Ramos denounced the 
impending coup and directed all members of the armed forces 
not to support the plot.108 Retired General Rafael Ileto 
109 
replaced Enrile as Minister of Defense.^ 
With the support of the AFP-led group of Ramos to the 
administration, Ramos and his generals then demanded certain 
reforms. They requested the resignation of cabinet members who 
were perceived to be corrupt or leftist and the setting of a 
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firm dealine for the conclusion of Aquino's talks with the 
Communist Party. 
2.  RAM-led Coups 
The Reformist group had expressed dissatisfaction in the 
manner the Aquino administration was dealing with the 
communist movement. Aquino and her advisers did not have an 
effective counterinsurgency program and claimed that their 
political incompetence led to the growth of the NPA. There was 
no political will to institute government and military reforms 
in order to strengthen national interests. Along this 
perception, the RAM developed its belief to intervene in the 
nation's political life. On August 28, 1987, Honasan led 
hundreds of troops in attacks on television stations, Villamor 
Air Base and the Malacanang Palace . The palace assault 
failed, and the rebel forces eventually rallied at Camp 
Aguinaldo where they seized the Armed Forces General 
Headquarters. In other parts of the country, military rebels 
also seized several military camps principally in Cebu, Bicol 
and the Philippine Military Academy. The coup collapsed after 
the first day. Honasan, with some followers managed to escape 
when the government troops reoccupied the camp and went 
underground. Many observers believed the coup came close to 
success. Honasan, at that time, remained at large, giving 
press interviews and moving freely until his capture in 
December 1987. The government court-martialed and sentenced 
several officers to lengthy prison terms. 
The Reformists complained that the Aquino government was 
critical of the military and unfairly lenient toward the 
communists. They further called for reform of the government 
and the military and for a more effective counterinsurgency 
program. A poll of military officers prior to the August coup 
attempt showed broad support for RAM's grievances and 
49 
substantial support for its tactics.110 Following the coup, 
the government responded to some military complaints by 
improving military pay and benefits, including housing for all 
ranks. The United States accelerated arms shipments at the 
government's request. Several retired military officers were 
given government positions, and finally, Aquino announced a 
hard line approach to the insurgency.111 With these actions, 
the government expected to erode the base support of the coup 
makers within the military thus reducing the chances of future 
military plots against the government to succeed. 
Meanwhile, the Young Officers Union (YOU) was launched by 
a cluster of lieutenents and captains on August 8, 1988.112 
Its beginnings are still somewhat obscure and tend to overlap 
with the RAM, but analysts believed many of these young 
officers, initially from PMA class 1978 to 1981, provided the 
jump start that allowed RAM to make its move against Marcos. 
Colonel Honasan contended that the group had evolved from a 
mere cadre of RAM into a nationwide network. These young 
officers during the 1986 People's Power revolution acted as 
messengers and watchers and to some extent made the coffee for 
senior officers. 
In 199 0, the YOU, an impatient alliance of self-styled 
nationalists, appeared to have taken the baton from the RAM 
as the rebellious wave of the future in the Philippine 
military. Unlike RAM, it is a shadowy cellular organization 
whose leadership core is believe to comprise a collection of 
junior intelligence officers using the experience they gained 
in the underground war against the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP). Among them are Scout Rangers Major Abraham 
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Purugganan and Captain Danilo Lim. Other significant players 
in the formation of the group are Captain Diosdado Valeroso, 
Captain Albert Yen and Lieutenant Pajarillo. However, YOU's 
structural leadership is not well-defined and remains largely- 
unknown.113 
Although then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa and 
other senior officials tend to playdown YOU's significance, 
Philippine and Western intelligence sources are taking it 
seriously. In a congressional testimony, United States deputy 
assistant secretary of defense, Carl Ford, acknowledged that 
YOU had played "an important role" in last December 1989 coup 
attempt, which came close to toppling President Corazon 
Aquino.114 In 1989, RAM allied itself with the YOU and the 
Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), a group of Marcos 
loyalists led by Brig.Gen. Jose Zumel; and evolved into a 
revolutionary organization. Thus the new name, 
Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa or Revolutionary 
Nationalist Alliance. The group initiated the bloody coup 
attempt on December 1,1989. They launched a series of attacks 
in Manila and seized a major air base in Cebu. Elite marines 
and army scout ranger units held parts of the army and air 
force headquarters and the Manila International Airport before 
moving to Camp Aguinaldo. Although the attack at the Armed 
Forces General Headquarters failed inspite of aerial 
bombardments by the rebels, the rebels seized part of the 
Makati's financial district. In a show of support to President 
Aquino, United States Air Force F-4's from Clark Air Base 
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later became the turning point of the revolt.115 The Makati 
seige ended on December 7,1989 with the negotiated surrender 
of the scout rangers and the Cebu rebellion collapsed two days 
later. Nearly 100 people died in the fighting, and more than 
600 were injured.116 
Aquino formed a commission to look into the grievances 
aired by the military rebels. The commission was headed by 
Hilario Davide with four other members; Ricardo Romulo, Delfin 
Lazaro, Christian Monsod and Carolina Hernandez.117 After a 
year-long investigation and personal visits to field units and 
the conduct of personal interviews to the officers and 
enlisted personnel, the Davide Commission revealed that all 
the grievances of the military were all legitimate. The low 
pay and allowances, graft and corruption in the military and 
in government, the lack of individual clothing and equipment 
issued to personnel assigned in the field, inadequacy of 
military housings, inadquate medical and dental care 
facilities and a weak counterinsurgency policy of government 
were some of the issues raised by the soldiers. The commission 
further surmised that there was also a hidden agenda in all 
these military adventurisms by the reformists and that the 
desire to attain power and personal interests.11 
RAM leaders lived underground while their followers who 
were captured and detained were facing court martial 
proceedings. Aquino ordered the dismissal from the service of 
all RAM leaders in the underground and officers who were 
115
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directly involved in the coup. She directed the military to 
conduct internal reforms and requested Congress to increase 
the AFP budget in order to improve the economic well-being of 
the soldiers and their families. 
E.  THE ELECTION OP RAMOS AS PRESIDENT 
In June 1992, a presidential election was held as the 
six-year tenure of President Aquino came to end. Fidel V. 
Ramos, who was anointed by Aquino as her candidate, won this 
bitterly contested electoral process. He won over five other 
presidential candidates by a slim majority. The electoral 
process exemplified the support of the people to democracy and 
the presence of many political parties indicated the return of 
the freedom of expression once suppressed during the Marcos 
regime. The Government had achieved legitimacy having massive 
popular support in the election. There was 70% voters turnout 
and this was high mark compared to the previous elections 
held.119 
119
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IV.  THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 
A.  THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION COMMISSION (NUC) 
President Fidel Ramos in his first State of the Nation 
address on July 27, 1992, emphasized that the advancement of 
peace and reconciliation shall be among the priorities of his 
administration. In pursuit of this agenda, he signed Executive 
Order No. 19 on September 1, 1992 creating the National 
Unification Commission (NUC) . 120 The NUC is an ad hoc 
advisory body to the President tasked to "formulate and 
recommend, after consulting with the concerned sectors of 
society, to the President... a viable general amnesty and 
peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and 
lasting peace in the country."121 
Ms. Haydee Yorac was designated by President Ramos as the 
Chairperson of the nine-member NUC.122 The other members of 
the Commission were: Bishop Fernando R, Capalla, Vice- 
Chairman, Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, Senator Wigberto E. 
Tanada, Congressman Jose W. Yap, Congressman Eduardo R. 
Ermita, Secretary Renato S. De Villa, Secretary Franklin M. 
Drilon, and Dr. Feliciano V. Carino. The NUC is represented by 
members of the executive branch, legislative branch and the 
non-government sectors. EO No. 19 also provided for a Council 
of Advisers which shall serve as a consultative body on the 
peace process and shall be composed of members to be 
designated by the President upon recommendation of the NUC. 
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In its task of consultation and dialogue towards the 
formulation of a national peace program, the NUC is guided by 
the following principles:123 
1. A national peace program should present a peace_ vision 
and process that is community based, reflecting the 
sentiments, values and principles important to all 
Filipinos. Thus, it shall not be defined not by 
government alone, nor by the different contending 
armed groups only, but by all Filipinos as one 
community. 
2. A national peace program seeks to forge a new social 
compact for just, equitable, humane and pluralistic 
society. 
It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic 
political society, where all individuals and groups 
are free to engage in peaceful competition for 
predominance of their political programs without fear, 
through the exercise of rights and liberties 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and where they may 
compete for political power through an electoral 
system that is free, fair and honest. 
3. A national peace program that seeks a principled and 
peaceful resolution of the armed conflicts, with 
neither blame or surrender, but with dignity of all 
concerned. 
Guided by these principles, the NUC is tasked to 
undertake the following:124 
1. Conduct of informal exploratory discussions with 
representatives of armed rebel groups. 
2. Promulgation of guidelines for the conduct of peace 
initiative by public officials. 
3. Conduct of national and local level consultations. 
123
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4. Support of confidence-building measures undertaken by 
government. 
B.  TEE INTERIM PEACE AGREEMENT 
After the exploratory and informal meetings with Ms. 
Yorac and some confidence-building efforts by the goverment, 
such as the gradual release of some detainees, suspension of 
the trial of certain cases, and cessation of hostile 
activities, the RAM/SFP/YOU leadership, rewarding the public 
clamor to give peace another chance and searching for other 
means to attain its goals and aspirations, signed the Interim 
Peace Agreement with the Government on December 23, 1992.125 
The agreement was signed by Defense Secretary Renato de Villa 
for the Government, and Commodore Domingo Calaj ate, Col. 
Gregorio Honasan and Capt . Danilo Lim for the 
RAM/SFP/YOU.12G The preliminary accord covered the 
following:127 
1. There shall be immediate and complete cessation of 
hostilities between the parties (including 
supporters) . Such cessation of hostilities shall cover 
all other acts short of armed activities which can be 
considered as hostile, like surveillance, special 
operations, arrests, recruitment, and any act or 
activity that can be considered as destabilization. 
2. The government shall suspend all court martial 
proceedings, and take steps to secure the suspension 
of judicial proceedings, including service of 
warrants, preliminary investigations and the like. 
3. Cessation of hostilities and the suspension of the 
offer of reward money shall be in force for the 
duration of this agreement and the formal talks. 
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4. The parties shall form their respective negotiating 
panels, finalize their talking points on January 
11,1993 and commence formal talks thereafter. 
5. Both parties shall operate consistently within the 
framework of the Constitution and the laws of the 
Republic of the Philippines. 
The interim peace agreement was the first significant 
step by the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU in an effort to 
attain a just, honorable and lasting peace. Both parties 
pledged to exert utmost to come to a just settlement for the 
benefit of the country and to the Filipino people. 
C.  RAM'S FIVE TALKING POINTS 
The Movement's Talking Points of 1993 were essentially 
the same as the Eight Talking Points an 1991 that were 
submitted to then President Aquino except that the issues on 
military bases, on Marcos, and on the national dialogue were 
deleted. 
The bases affair had been decided by the people and that 
of the Marcos has become more of a matter between the 
government and the Marcos family, while the on-going peace 
process substantially addresses the call for national dialogue 
of all contending forces. The remaining five issues centered 
on: good government, electoral reforms, social reforms, 
economic reforms and military and security reforms. The 
RAM/SFP/YOU submitted to the Government panel their listing of 
minimum programs in support to these talking points as shown 
in APPENDIX. PROGRAMS. 
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The 1993 Talking points are as follows:128 
1. Attainment of a Good, Honest, Pro-People, and 
Efficient Government for National Renewal and 
Transformation. 
The RAM/SFP/YOU argues that the Filipinos have been led 
to believe in several political and socio-economic myths which 
have since become ingrained in our soiety as sound tenets but 
which are in reality only assumptions. 
One of these is that political leadership is a birthright 
of the economic and intellectual elite. 
Consequently, in our so-called representative democracy, 
an elite minority has come to control all our political and 
economic fortunes and has unilaterally decided what is 
supposed to be best for the country. This spawned the politics 
of patronage and over-centralization of power and authority. 
This is turn led to a bloated, inefficient and 
graft-ridden bureaucracy; over-dependence on government and 
the resultant over-commitment of, and strain on public 
resources; and serious anomalies in the relationships between 
the people, sectoral groups and government. 
Big government dominated by the elite governed on a 
borrowed fallacy that what is good for the elite must be good 
for the country. This scandalous relationship has perpetuated 
a political culture which allows the broad masses of people 
the periodic circuses of elections and other political 
processes and the often superficial but isolated attempts at 
solving the country's ills, waged as small wars to be won by 
proper strategy and tactics and the complement of either 
incompetent well-meaning or competent but empire building 
public functionaries. Thus, the war on poverty, the war on 
128 The National Unification Commission and Peace 
Process, NUC Secretariat, Quezon City, Philippines, 1993. 
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drug abuse, the war on criminality, the campaign to rid the 
armed services of scalawags, and media word wars. Amidst these 
spectacles, people's expectations continued to grow. The 
government then, because of the same political culture, tended 
to excel at proclaiming worthy goals but shunned setting 
standards of accountability and obligation. This became 
necessary to perpetuate the politicians' hold on power and for 
the elite to continue to protect its own interest and its 
members who may have transgressed even their own laws. It is 
therefore obvious that fundamental structural and behavioral 
changes are necessary all around. 
Change must however start with the government. We need a 
government with the political will, capacity and capability of 
governance; one which can lead and be able to make and enforce 
fundamental policy decisions to enable it to serve and protect 
the people and promote the general welfare. Governance 
requires the ability to deliver basic services and the 
creation of an environment in which our people may "build a 
just and humane society" and secure for themselves " the 
blessings of independence and democracy," not one which exists 
only for the elite and pays lip service to genuine democracy 
and the so-called "people empowerment." 
The changes are bound to be excruciatingly painful 
precisely because our politics remain beholden to domestic and 
foreign interests and the bureaucracy has long been inure to 
the basics of public service. 
A start could be made, so that we may eventually have a 
government for national renewal and transformation, one which 
shall provide the institutional base for economic recovery, 
moral regeneration and a professional bureaucracy in the 
civil foreign and military services providing the continuity 
for the implementation of fundamental policies and the bulwark 
against the vagaries and excesses of politics. 
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2. Implementation of Electoral Reforms to ensure Clean, 
Honest, Orderly, and Free Elections. 
The Movement believes that elections are among the 
political processes which are essential in a democracy. 
Properly exercised, the right of suffrage is the most positive 
manifestation of the principle that sovereignty resides in the 
people and all government authority emanates from them. 
Prostituted, the process becomes the contrived way by which an 
elite minority legitimizes political dominion over the broad 
masses and more often than not, perpetuates the socio-economic 
inequities that our people must get rid of. There is therefore 
a compelling need to democratize the process so that the 
opportunity for peaceful access to political power would in 
reality available to all. Concomitantly, the need for more 
safeguards and structural reform in the electoral process is 
necessary so that the opportunity, when made available, would 
not be frustrated by machinations so often perpetrated by the 
same elites who have kept our country in political and 
socio-economic bondage in collaboration with their local and 
foreign cohorts. 
3. Implementation of Nationalist Economic Development 
Policies and Programs. 
They aver that we are a nation in deep economic crisis. 
We have an economy which cannot generate jobs nor provide the 
essential goods and services required by a sizable and 
expanding population. Thus, the cream of our labor force is 
impelled to seek employment in foreign lands, many under 
conditions of virtual slavery. We even import rice, matches, 
and a whole range of products which could be produced 
domestically. We have an inefficient agricultural sector which 
is likewise retrogressing rapidly. The economy functions 
primarily as a source of raw materials and cheap labor for 
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transnational enterprise and a dumping ground for foreign 
products. We are mired in debts which we can never hope to pay- 
but which continue to sap the nations vitality and its 
resources. 
Yet, we are a nation blessed with abundant human and 
natural resources. When then does the fundamental problem lie? 
We have remained stagnant and have in fact been retrogressing 
relative to our neighbors in Asia because we have not attained 
economic independence even as we gained the trappings of 
political independence. The colonial economic and social 
systems and structures largely remained and were readily 
transposed into the more invidious forms of neo-colonialism. 
The political, economic and social inequities which are the 
results of these must be addressed so that the economy could 
be made to grow. The factors of production and the fruits of 
growth must be equally redistributed. We cannot continue to 
insist on making the elite sectors of our society better off, 
when it means making the broader masses of our people worse 
off. For that is where we really are right now. We peg the 
price standards on basic staples and cereals to protect urban 
consumers at the cost of the agricultural sector. We continue 
to hold down labor's share of fruits of production to protect 
a manufacturing sector which refuses to be more efficient and 
insist on get-rich-quick export oriented industries. We have 
given up what could be our greatest patrimony to foreign 
producers and their local partners, our domestic market. 
It is therefore easy to see that the priority task is to 
arrest the economic crisis to lay the foundations for 
sustainable development. This would require a complete 
reversal of current government policies in several areas of 
the economy and modification of others elsewhere. Some of 
these policies and their concomitant programs need to be 
implemented immediately to effect real redistribution of 
wealth and raise incomes of the majority of our people and 
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support our vast local market. Others shall be implemented in 
a deliberate transformative process that should not fall prey- 
to the perfidies of national politics to lead us to 
sustainable growth and development. 
The main policy thrust of government should aim at full 
control of the domestic market and resources, encouragement of 
and even direct intervention in setting up the basic 
industries, capital formation and expansion of investments all 
to be expressed in an integrated national development plan 
which shall be the economic blueprint. 
4. Actualization of social justice programs to positively 
address poverty, unemployment, and criminality. 
Social justice programs of governments everywhere almost 
always aim to remove social, economic and cultural inequities; 
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human 
dignity, and generally, promote total human liberation and 
development. Government is expected to ensure that the 
national economy progresses and then to ensure that the wealth 
accumulated is used and distributed in socially accepted ways. 
Constitutional provisions, laws and programs thus provided for 
our broad masses. The movement's leaders opine that these were 
all good and heart warming, but all suffer from one basic flaw 
that is, they were never implemented. This is so because our 
politics are imcompatible with the attainment of social 
justice. For one, the elite which exercises the political and 
economic power are not usually benevolent, witness the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and Hacienda Luisita. 
For another, politicians must always pander to the 
electorate's expectations, even if such expectations cannot be 
justified or even when attempts to satisfy those result into 
more strain on government resources or unleashes more social 
ills. This does not however mean that social justice must take 
back seat to political reform and economic recovery. Rather, 
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in the context of the structural approaches we have already 
prescribed, progress in social justice can accompany advances 
in the two other aspects of our national life in such a manner 
where contradictions can be blunted if not removed altogether. 
In prescribing good government as the cornerstone of 
their position on political reforms, they indicated the 
democratization of our political process and delivery of basic 
services would eventually lead to true political independence 
and democracy which will allow our people to really engineer 
our own social and industrial revolution. 
In the economic arena, rural development and 
industrialization with social costs considered would 
eventually result in the alleviation of poverty through better 
incomes for rural communities and labor. Political 
democratization loses its integrity unless the people also 
attain economic independence. Attainment of both will then 
allow the people a measure of dignity and quality of life 
which is the true measure of economic development. 
A minimum program therefore to actualize social justice 
should address the social impacts of poverty, the equal access 
by all sectors of society to basic services and opportunities 
for upward mobility, the removal of basic injustices from 
society and the assurance of and protection of human rights 
and dignity. Clearly, fundamental policy and structural 
changes are also necessary here. 
Our general welfare and well being as a people must 
proceed from a consensus that not all expectations can be met, 
that we must think of sharing the responsibilities for our 
future and that the country can only move forward if our 
leaders and our citizens take more responsibility for their 
actions and accept that some societal expectations can be 
temporarily given less attention in favor of more compelling 
ones. Critical in determining whether people can escape 
poverty is what they do for themselves. Critical likewise in 
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ensuring that the justice system prevails and human rights to 
include the rights of women, children and cultural minorities 
are enhanced, is responsible people mobilization and a 
redifinition of relationships between ourselves, our 
organizations and the government. 
5. Review and realignment of national defense and 
security concerns to attune these with our fundamental 
requirements and aspirations. 
The military has traditionally been classified as an 
instrument of political power. As such, it has often been 
misunderstood. In its classical employment, armies were deemed 
primarily responsible for protecting the State and guarding 
and securing the institutions and sacred values of society. As 
such, it should be ideally be isolated from day to day 
problems in governnance; its functions only to be invoked in 
times of national crises. Because of these definitions, the 
military establishment is distinguished from all other 
institutions in society. Because of its unique functions, its 
claim on resources and impacts on the rest of national policy 
are often sources of conflict. Military expenditure often 
means sacrificing in some other socio-economic requirement. 
The military affects the lives of those who serve in it as 
well as those whom it must serve. It affects politics and 
politicians. It affects national decision making and many of 
our social options. 
The RAM/SFP/YOU states that if we all continue to believe 
that a military establishment, even a modest one, is 
anecessary appendage in our existence as a nation, then the 
important questions which a national consensus must answer is 
how the military is to be shaped, employed and controlled. 
Heretofore, people outside the military establishment have not 
really bothered to take the trouble to understand nor 
positively address these questions. The prevailing sentiment 
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seemed to be why take the trouble to understand what is so 
easy to condemn? They contend that if the military is to be 
employed properly and controlled intelligently, its 
capabilities and limitations as well as its aspirations must 
be understood by people inside and outside the establishment. 
This is particularly relevant in recent times and for 
posterity. Militarization and military intervention are 
repugnant by-words in current usage. The existing Constitution 
is full of prescriptions on how to control the military 
through many provisions which betray and institutionalize both 
an ignorance of and bias against the military. For example, 
the military is mandated to protect the State and the people 
but we avoid the fact and oftentimes refuse to accept the fact 
that protecting and securing can only be accomplished by 
inflicting and threatening to inflict death and destruction on 
those who seek to destroy the State and harm our people. 
Granted that this may in fact be an accurate expression of our 
people's consensus and will on the military, then it becomes 
more imperative to undertake fundamental changes in this 
institution, to allay the fears and to make the military in 
reality the true protector of the State and the people, not 
the instrument by which the ruling elites or sectors thereof 
may perpetuate the political, economic and social ills we all 
seek to extirpate from our society. 
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V.  GOVERNMENT COUNTERMOVES AND NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
A.  BASIC NEGOTIATION GUIDELINES AND FRAMEWORK 
In the conduct of the peace talks, the government panel 
must adhere to the following guidelines or negotiation 
framework: 
1. All dealings and agreements to be reached with the 
RAM/SFP/YOU panel must be within the Philippine 
constitutional framework. 
2. Under no circumstance the Philippine sovereignty and 
territorial integrity shall be compromised. They are 
non-negotiable. 
3. The government negotiating panel should not threat the 
RAM/SFP/YOU as a governing political entity exercising 
jurisdiction over a specific territory. Neither they 
should be considered as representative of the Filipino 
people. 
4. The government panel must always show the sincerity of 
its purpose in seeking a just, peaceful and meaningful 
solution to the military rebels' cause. 
5. No foreigner, individual or group, will be allowed to 
participate in the conduct of the peace negotiations. 
6. Various concerned sectors of society must participate 
in the peace process, directly or indirectly, to give 
expression to the collective will of the people. 
7. The government peace effort should not be taken as a 
sign of weakness. Although the government remains on 
top of the situation, it prefers a negotiated 
settlement with the military rebels. 
8. In seeking a negotiated settlement with the military 
rebels, the government's primary concern is the 
immediate restoration of just and meaningful peace, 
national reconciliation and unity as preconditions to 
economic progress and prosperity. 
9. The agreements to be reached must be binding to the 
government as well as the RAM/SFP/YOU and all their 
organs and instrumentalities. 
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B.  GOVERNMENT POSITIONS 
The government panel must take the following positions on 
issues/demands that the RAM/SFP/YOU has raised: 
Issues/Demands 
Good Government 
1. Initiation of policy 
changes in public 
administration and structural 
reforms. 
2. Eradication of graft 
and corruption in government. 
3. Return to the 
fundamental values in public 
offices. 
4. Delivery of basic 
services. 
Government Position 
Acceptable. This    is    a 
continuing government  concern. 
Acceptable.        It    is    part    of 
government program. 
Acceptable. This    is    a 
continuing government  concern. 
Acceptable. This is part of 
government program conducted 
based on priority due to 
inadequate gov't resources. 
Electoral Reforms 
1. Democratization    of 
elections. 
2. Implementation of 
structural reforms at the 
Commission of Elections 
(COMELEC). 
3. Initiation    of 
procedural  reforms. 
Acceptable subject to 
legislative measure that 
Congress may enact. 
Acceptable subject to 
legislative measure that 
Congress may enact. 
Acceptable.     This    is    a 
continuing government  concern. 
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Economic Reforms 
Adoption of nationalist 
economic policies and programs 
in the following areas; fiscal 
and monetary, investment, 
industrial, commerce and 
trade,agricultural and natural 
resources, services and 
technology policies and 
cooperativism. 
Social Reforms 
1. Actualization of the 
agrarian reform program. 
2. Prioritization of the 
primary health care program. 
3. Provision for free 
primary and secondary education 
in public  schools. 
4. Administration of 
social programs. 
5. Pro-labor reforms 
a. Higher wages 
b. Improvement of the 
judicial and quasi-judical 
settlement of labor cases and 
labor problems. 
6 . Overhaul criminal 
justice system. 
Acceptable but based on the 
final recommendation of 
impartial experts and technical 
people who have jurisdiction on 
the respective areas of 
interests. 
Acceptable    subject     to 
legislative    measures    that 




Acceptable    subject    to   market 
forces. 
Acceptable    subject     to 
legislative    measure     that 
Congress may enact. 
Acceptable.    This    is    a 
continuing government program. 
7. Initiate programs to 
enhance and promote human 
dignity. 
Acceptable. This    is    a 
continuing government program. 
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Security and Military Reforms 
1. Restructure national 
defense concepts, doctrines and 
organizations. 
2. Restructure and 
reorganize the Armed Forces. 
3. Instill professionalism 
and eliminate graft in the 
Armed Forces. 
Acceptable subject to 
legislative measures that 
Congress many enact. 
Acceptable, although this is a 
continuing process in the Armed 
Forces. 
No need to discuss. As a 
matter of policy, the Armed 
Forces does not tolerate nor 
countenance military scalawags. 
C.  GOVERNMENT CODNTERISSUES AND COUNTERDEMANDS 
The government panel should not assume strictly passive 
posture; if the situation demands, it must take aggressive 
stance, turning the table against the RAM/SFP/YOU especially 
when it becomes palpably clear that the other side is just 
using the peace negotiation as a springboard for its 
propaganda assault. 
Accordingly, the government panel should ask the 
RAM/SFP/YOU to: 
1. Abandon the use of arms in seeking government 
reforms.129 Instead, try to attain the RAM/SFP/YOU 
dreams and visions through legal and peaceful means. 
2. Surrender their firearms, specifically the offensive 
weapons in their possession i.e. Light Anti-tank 
Weapon (LAW). The RAM had at least 40 LAW'S, nine of 
which were ceremoniously turned over to the 
129
 "Rebel boss, 14 others get amnesty," Philippine News, 
7-13 December 1994, p.7. 
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government. 13° 
3.   Help    in    the    common    task    of    promoting    national 
reconciliation    and    unity    to    expedite    economic 
131 recovery. ■"■ 
D.  NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
1.  Role of the Government 
What is the Government's approach towards the attainmemnt 
of a just , comprehensive and lasting peace? Executive Order 
No. 125 mandates that the government's comprehensive peace 
efforts shall be pursued along the "Six Paths to Peace" as 
recommended by the NUC on the basis of its consultations.132 
The First Path is the pursuit of social, economic and 
political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of the 
internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require 
administrative action, new legislation, or even constitutional 
amendments. 
The Second Path is consensus-building and empowerment for 
peace. This component includes continuing consultations on 
both national and local levels to build consensus on the peace 
and reform agenda, and the mobilization and facilitation of 
people's participation in the peace 
process. 
130 "The Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa," 
BusinessWorld. May 11,1994, p.l; "Gringo still undecided on 
running for Senate," Manila Standard. August 26,1994, p.2. 
i3i «RAM, gov't panel agree to speed up peace 
negotiations," BusinessWorld. July 28,1994, p.10: "Gov't 
appeals to RAM," Manila Bulletin. January 21,1994, p.l; "RAM 
rebs hit for delaying peace gab," Philippine Times Journal. 
January 21,1994, p.6. 
132 "Toward a just, Comprehensive and Lasting Peace," 
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 1993, 
pp.15-17. 
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The Third Path is the pursuit of peaceful negotiated 
settlement with the different rebel groups. This involves the 
vigorous efforts toward the completion of exploratory talks, 
the holding of formal peace negotiations, and the achievement 
of a final negotiated peace settlement with each of the rebel 
groups. 
The Fourth Path is the implementation of programs for 
reconciliation, reintegration to mainstream society, and, 
rehabilitation. These include amnesty and other measures to 
respond to concerns for legal status and security, and 
community-based assistance programs to address the economic, 
social and psychological rehabilitation needs of former 
rebels, demobilized combatants, and civilian victims of the 
internal armed conflicts. 
The Fifth Path seeks to ensure the welfare and protection 
of civilians, and to reduce the impact of the armed conflicts 
on them, recognizing the possibility of continuing hostilities 
even as peace is pursued by the ways of peace. These include 
the strict implementation of laws and policy guidelines for 
the protection of human rights, limited suspension of 
offensive military operations where possible, intensified 
delivery of basic services to conflict areas, and recognition 
of Peace Zones as agreed upon by concerned sectors of the 
community. 
The Sixth and Final Path seeks to build, nurture and 
enhance a positive climate of peace. These include continued 
confidence-building measures between government and the rebel 
groups, and peace advocacy and education within the rest of 
society. 
These six paths to peace are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. Therefore, these must be pursued simultaneously, 
with equal vigor and determination, in order to achieve a 
just, comprehensive and lasting peace. 
72 
2. Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
The military establishment must maintain a low-profile 
posture in the negotiation processes, but must remain firm and 
decisive in dealing with the military rebels. 
The AFP must adhere strictly to the provisions laid out 
in the Preliminary Agreement between the Government and the 
RAM/SFP/YOU i.e. cessation of hostilities , suspension of 
court martial proceedings, judicial proceedings and reward 
133 money. J
Discipline and proper behavior are crucial at this point. 
The government should not give chance to the military rebels 
to hurl charges of violations of the agreement against the 
AFP. 
3. Duration 
The government should not allow the formal peace 
negotiations to drag inconclusively over a long period of 
time. Limit it to one year, to be extended by three more 
months if necessary, or a total of fifteen months. Prolonged 
negotiation period will give the RAM/SFP/YOU more precious 
time for unhampered propaganda exposure. Further, the 
stability of the country will be at stake and the 
implementation of the developmental plans will be 
affected.134 
4. Participants 
Participants must be strictly limited to accredited 
members of the government and the RAM/SFP/YOU panels. No 
foreign nationals or organizations should be allowed to 
participate in the negotiation. 
133 preliminary Agreement dated December 23,1993. 
134
 "Gov't panel appeals to RAM," Manila Bulletin. 
January 21,1994, p.l; "RAM rebs hit for delaying peace gab," 
Philippine Times Journal. January 21,1994, p.6. 
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5. Media Coverage 
There should be a pooled media coverage to minimize undue 
stress on the negotiators. Press releases/press conferences 
and media interviews must be jointly conducted based on 
mutually agreed guidelines. 
6. Other Suggested Government Countermoves 
a. Release deserving military detainees/prisoners as 
manifestation of the government's sincerity.135 
b. Pursue the implementation of an unconditional amnesty 
program mainly addressed to the top and middle leadership and 
the RAM/SFP/YOU rank and file.136 
c. In framing the agenda for discussion during the 
projected talks, avoid vague generalities. Insist on being 
specific to avoid ambiguities that can be subsequently 
exploited for disinformation purposes. 
d. During the peace negotiations, give no chance to the 
other side to delay the proceedings. Aim for decisive results 
within the shortest possible time. 
135 HRAM asked to resume peace talks," Malaya, January 
21,1994,p.2. 
136
 "Rebel boss, 14 others get amnesty," Philippine News. 
7-13 December 1994, p.7; "RAM still rejects edicts on amnesty 
for rebels," Manila Chronicle. May 18,1994, p.10; "RAM leaders 
say amnesty should be unconditional," Today. May 18,1994, p.5. 
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VI.  CODNTERMEASURES EMPLOYED BY OTHER COUNTRIES 
As in the Philippines, peace agreements in other 
countries are being forged as the role of peace and order in 
economic development can never be set aside. 
In Mexico, for instance, peace negotiations initiated by- 
President Carlos Salinas with the Zapatista National 
Liberation Army finally gained ground when the group composed 
of Maya Indian rebels agreed to sit down for a peace 
settlement with the goverment. 
Desperate to continue improving its public image in the 
wake of the change given by the United States through the 
North American Free Trade Agreemnet (NAFTA), Mexico saw the 
need to end the hostilities fast. "Repression gives a 
resonance that echoes to the whole world," one public official 
said. 
The Zapatistas, composed of around 2,000 descendants of 
the ancient Maya civilization, gave Mexico its most horrifying 
nightmare when they launched a peasant uprising on New Year's 
eve in 1993, which victimized the stock market and sent in 
investment running. 
As if on cue, Mr. Salinas offered peace talks, a 
ceasefire and general amnesty, like a father would offer his 
crying child candies. It turned out, however, the Zapatistas 
did not just aspire for indigenuous rights. Mr. Salinas would 
have to address his country's growing poverty, unequal 
distribution of wealth, corruption in Government and rampant 
human rights violations. 
Similarly, in 1992, the United Nations had to help in 
order for the Government of El Salvador to forge peace 
settlement with the Marti National Liberation Front to end the 
armed struggle that caused the death of at least 75,000 
people. The end of the twelve years of strife gave birth to a 
revitalized economy. 
75 
Peru's 14 years of insurgency offers no difference in 
terms of effects, judging from the economic slump it now 
suffers. However, a different means was employed for the same 
end of an economic take-off. 
Seen as a good sign, Shining Path, a Maoist group aiming 
for a peasant-worker state, celebrated its 14th anniversary 
recently without its trademark of violence. This shows the 
government's claims that violence is down may be true. 
Still, President Alberto Fujimori does not have a 
peaceful settlement in his mind and promised his countrymen a 
counterinsurgency plan in the mold of Vietnam. He was qouted 
as saying, "My Government is determined to completely defeat 
the Shining Path out of its stronghold."137 He vowed to 
finish off the Shining Path's more than a decade of revolt by 
combat before his term ends in 1995. In 1994, rebel forces 
should have been restricted to only small corner in the 
country. Mr. Fujimori appears to be succeeding but only after 
more than 27,000 deaths and at least $22 billion in property 
damage. 
The lessons of Mexico, El Salvador and Peru teach the 
country's peacemakers that, first, violence is expensive, and 
second, peace is something man must toil for. Mexico's 
experience showed the problem of insurgency must never be 
swept under the rug in an effort to look good to investors and 
that peace is the first thing needed in order to keep new 
investments coming. 
Also, political armed struggle needs the integrity of 
negotiations for settlement if a lasting peace is to be 
attained. The idea of addressing the root causes of armed 
struggle, no matter how obnoxious to the Government, must be 
done. Economic development soon follows. 
137 «violence is expensive: peace must be toiled for," 
BnsinessWorld. May 12,1994, p.l. 
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Ambassador Manuel Yan, chairman of the government panel 
with the Muslim rebels and the concurrent Presidential Adviser 
on the Peace Process, said peace efforts by the Government 
should be seen in the light of our economic take-off.138 He 
further stated, "The peace process is the principal 
cornerstone of the Ramos Administration. It is necessary to 
arrive at the objective of Philippine 2000. "139 The city of 
Manila, which was turned into a war zone during the series of 
coups launched in the 1980's, will benefit from the peaceful 
environment resulting from the peace talks. Ambassador Yan 
averred, "This will help give a better life for our people. 
There are many foreign investors and capitalists who are eager 
to give their funds in terms of investments in the 
Philippines. Full development cannot be brought about as long 
as there is violence."140 
138
 "Ramos orders gov't panels to step up negotiations 
with rebel groups," BusinessWorld. March 22,1994, p.12; 
"Toward a Just, Comprehensive and Lasting Peace," Office of 
the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, 1993, p.3. 
139 «violence is expensive: peace must be toiled for," 






The government initiated peace process with the 
RAM/SFP/YOU comes at a most opportune time; the advent of a 
new administration traditionally raises renewed hope for 
meaningful changes in the conduct of national affairs; 
militarily and politically, the military rebel capabilities 
have been greatly reduced as the result of the government's 
reconciliation efforts. 
There have already been many efforts exerted by the 
RAM/SFP/YOU and Government panels in order to establish a 
favorable climate for peace through negotiated settlement. 
Likewise, it is very apparent that the contending forces 
have similar issues of concern: they share the same concern 
for the welfare of the Filipino people; the reforms they seek 
are almost the same too; and they have expressed a desire to 
pursue a peace process.141 Thus, there is a basis for unity 
and agreements. 
The pursuit for peace is a difficult task. Peace does not 
only mean the silence of the guns. It shall be realized only 
by eradicating the reasons why some of the Filipino people 
have resorted to the gun to redress their grievances. Further, 
the contending parties should also see to it that whatever 
agreements made, they should be strictly implemented. 
There are many paths to peace and a variety of approaches 
to the grave issues of conflict and violence that confront the 
nation. And yet, only the confidence and trust of both parties 
generate by their respective actions can truly lay the 
foundations for a just settlement of the most visible and 
141 HRAM# gov't panel agree to speed up peace 
negotiations," BusinessWorld. July 28,1994, p.10; "RAM, gov't 
panel to resume talks at working body level," BusinessWorld, 
March 28,1994, p.15; "Ramos orders gov't panels to step up 
negotiations with rebel groups," BusinessWorld. March 22,1994, 
p. 12. 
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enduring signs of conflict. While the peace negotiations are 
being pursued, there are equally important concerns that must 
be vigorously pursued. More than 40 per cent of the Philippine 
population is poor.142 President Fidel Ramos unveiled his 
economic plan, »Philippines 2000 "143 when he assumed the 
Presidency in June 20,1992 aimed at improving the Philippine 
economy. 
In dealing with the RAM/SFP/YOU negotiating panel 
including the men behind it, individual interests and 
personalities of the persons involved must be put in 
consideration. For it can be reasonably ascertained that their 
orientation, position in the movement and commitment to the 
rebel cause will greatly influence their decision. Thus, 
giving them leeways for graceful exit and treating them with 
respect and compassion without rendering violence to their 
sense of pride and dignity, ideological belief or political 
convictions will make the government's peace initiative more 
attractive. 
Should the members of the RAM/SFP/YOU negotiating panel 
remain adamant in their intransigent position and the peace 
process meets rough sailing, a change in the direction of the 
government moves and countermoves may yield desirable results. 
If addressed to the rebel rank and file, such government 
efforts will demoralize their followers and supporters and 
push discontented and vacillating military rebels back to the 
folds of military justice. The government's offer of amnesty 
142
 Weissman, Robert. "The politics of economic chaos in 
the Philippines" Multinational Monitor. Jan-Feb 1994, Vol.15, 
No.1-2, p.13. 
143
 The "Philippine 2000" is President Fidel Ramos' 
vision of making the Philippines join the newly industrialized 
countries (NIC's) by year 2000. It is expected to increase the 
country's gross national product by 10 per cent by the year 
1998, and the national per capita income is expected to 
increase from $750 to $1000 per year. 
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will greatly enhance its peace effort. Pursued as a unilateral 
act of magnanimity on the part of the government, the amnesty 
program can be implemented even without being a part of the 
peace talks agenda. It will work two ways: improve the 
government image and, to a great extent, weaken the will to 
resist of certain sectors of the reformist movement. It must 
be anticipated, however, that some of those who will avail of 
the amnesty program will just seek "legal status" so that 
later on they can move freely while openly working for the 
movement just the same especially in the field of political 
struggle. 
By and large, during the peace negotiations, the 
government can offset the disadvantages it is facing by 
vigorously pursuing the overriding objectives: 
1. Attain a just and lasting peace, and hopefully, a 
permanent solution to the military rebels problem. 
2. Or, if this is impossible because of the intansigent 
position of the top RAM/SFP/YOU leadership, ensure at 
least an unreproachable moral and psychological 
victory for the government. 
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VIII.  PROGNOSIS 
A.  SCENARIOS 
Based on the foregoing discussions and findings, the 
following future shape of events expressed in terms of 
scenarios are hereby projected together with corresponding 
recommended government moves and countermoves to protect 
national interests. 
The entire peace process can be conveniently divided into 
three stages: 
Stage I - Exploratory/Pre-Negotiation Period 
Stage II - Formal Negotiation Period 
Stage III - Post-Negotiation Period 
By the end of 1994, the peace process has started the 
Formal Negotiation Period (Stage II) . The main highlights thus 
far were: 
1. In late 1992, NUC Chairperson Yorac held a series of 
discreet meetings with former Colonel Gregorio Honasan 
and former Commodore Domingo Calajate, Chairman of the 
RAM Executive Committee. Through her, the RAM 
submitted to the NUC the list of Talking Points, as 
well as the names of its Panel Members and 
Secretariat. 
2. To enable the military rebels to conduct their own 
consultations, the NUC issued Safe Conduct Passes for 
those in hiding, as well as passes for the temporary 
release of BGen.Edgardo Abenina and other detained 
military rebels designated as Panel Members and 
Secretariat. 
3. On December 23,1992, the Government and the 
RAM/SFP/YOU signed a Preliminary Agreement providing 
for the cessation of hostilities, suspension of courts 
martial proceedings, judicial proceedings, and reward 
money, and for the formation of panels to engage in 
formal talks within the framework of the Constitution 
and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. 
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4. President Fidel V. Ramos appointed a Government Panel 
headed by University of the Philippines Law Professor 
Alfredo Tadiar. The RAM/SFP/YOU Panel is chaired by 
Brig General Edgardo Abenina. 
5. Formal negotiations between the Government and the 
RAM/SFP/YOU commenced on January 22,1993. The talks 
had initially moved slowly because of administrative 
concerns, including the issue of security for the 
RAM/SFP/YOU Panel and Secretariat. 
6. An agreement on the security arrangements for the 
military rebels was signed by the Government and the 
RAM/SFP/YOU Panels. A formal ceremony opening the 
substantive phase of formal talks was held on June 
24,1993. This means that the talks shall now focus on 
substantive Talking Points. From this point, the peace 
process may either fail or succeed as projected in the 
following scenarios: 
a.   Scenario 1 
1). Developments 
This scenario assumes that during the 
formal negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will take advantage of 
the negotiation period to ventilate through the media and 
public fora its grievances against the government, intensify 
its information campaign, make impossible demands and tie down 
the government on ticklish politico-military and socio- 
economic issues. With or without effective government 
countermoves/counterissues, the RAM/SFP/YOU will scuttle the 
talks, putting the blame on the government. Peace talks 
collapse in a flicker, or with a semblance of a "stalemate" 
over some tough issues. Whichever is the case, the government 
and the RAM/SFP/YOU will exchange charges and countercharges 
of dealing in bad faith. 
2). Probability/Desirability 
Since the situation remains fluid and 
that both the RAM/SFP/YOU and the Government Panels are still 
in the process of positioning and strengthening their 
negotiation strategies, it is more probable that Scenario 1 
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will take place. It is precisely what the RAM/SFP/YOU has in 
its secret agenda through which the movement hopes to gain 
strategic victory. 
This Scenario as projected is 
definitely undesirable unless the government can control the 
situation and blunt the RAM/SFP/YOU self-serving intentions 
and courses of action. 
3) . Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action 
During the post-negotiation period 
(Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will: 
a). Go underground and initiate 
destabilizing threats to the government. 
b). Intensify information campaigns 
against the government through both local and foreign media. 
c) . Regroup and strengthen their 
logistical base support. 
4). Recommended Government Countermoves 
a). Pursue the peace talks; keep the 
door open for further peace negotiations with the RAM/SFP/YOU 
leaders; and 
b) . Continue the policy of 
attraction; push through the amnesty offer to all military 
rebels. 
b.  Scenario 2 
1). Developments 
This Scenario is a departure from 
Scenario 1. It assumes that the peace talks did not bog down. 
The proceedings continue, but just the same, during the 
negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will take advantage of the 
negotiation period to ventilate through the media and public 
fora its grievances against the government, intensify its 
information campaign, make impossible demands and tie down the 
government on ticklish politico-military and socio-economic 
issues. But compelled either by strong public opinion and/or 
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by other factors including the common desire to come up with 
any tangible negotiation result, both panels sign a "lame" 
agreement, a protocol or a joint declaration deliberately 
replete with civil but broad, ambiguous generalities which 
later on will be the cause of renewed hostility between the 
two sides due to conflicting interpretations of said 
agreements. 
2). Probability/Desirability 
The Scenario is considered most 
probable because in the likely possibility that the 
negotiations reach an impasse, both panels may seek a face- 
saving device that will enable them to come out of the 
negotiation room with a semblance of accomplishment. However, 
if carefully crafted with adequate safeguards against undue 
advantage for the RAM/SFP/YOU and possible embarrassment for 
the government, the Scenario may become tolerable. 
3) . Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action 
During the post-negotiation period 
(Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will: 
a). Look for loopholes in the 
agreement, make its own interpretation, make impossible 
demands, then blame the government; and 
b). Intensify information campaigns 
against the government through local and foreign media. 
4). Recommended Government Countermoves 
a) . Continue the policy of 
attraction, pursue the amnesty offer to all military rebels; 
b).  Intensify campaign on loose 
firearms, especially the surrender of offensive weapons of the 
military rebels; and 
c) . Sustain government information 
drives on government programs which directly address the 
military rebel issues and grievances. 
86 
c.   Scenario 3 
This is a variation of Scenario 2 where 
the peace negotiations take place after reaching a compromise. 
During the negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will demand a number 
of concessions. With the government panel hard pressed by the 
imperatives of national reconciliation, unity, peace and 
immediate solution to the peace and order problem as 
prerequisites to economic progress and prosperity, the two 
panels sign a lopsided agreement allowing the RAM/SFP/YOU to 
share power in running the government. 
2). Probability/Desirability 
The Scenario projected is least 
probable as it may prove untenable under the Constitution. As 
it is, the Scenario is most undesirable. 
3). Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses 
At the post-negotiation period, the 
RAM/SFP/YOU will: 
a) . Emerge triumphant as it gains 
decisive political victory; 
b). Start moving to consolidate the 
political gains made; intensify organizational work with 
various sectors of society; 
c) . Mount non-confrontational 
propaganda drive to enhance the RAM/SFP/YOU image and the 
cause it is espousing, and win more supporters/followers; and 
d) . Temporarily suspend destabilizing 
moves. 
4). Recommended Government Countermoves 
This Scenario should not happen in 
the first place, but assuming it does, among the best possible 
thing that the government could do under the situation are: 
a). Interpret the agreement in 
support of the constitutional government; 
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b). Blunt/oppose any RAM/SFP/YOU 
attempt to subvert the country's democratic processes; 
strictly enforce all applicable laws against such nefarious 
end; and 
c). Find ways and means to abrogate 
with sufficient justification the lopsided agreement, 
d.   Scenario 4 
1). Developments 
This Scenario is another but highly 
advantageous variation of Scenario 2 where peace negotiations 
take place after reaching a compromise. Peace talks proceed 
smoothly; issues are discussed frankly and dispassionately in 
the true spirit of brotherhood. Differences are threshed out 
and ticklish issues are amicably settled based on the 
principle of give and take. A mutually acceptable agreement is 
signed, giving the military rebels a graceful exit and certain 
concessions. The military rebels threat to national stability 
ends as a new era of peace, national reconciliation and unity 
is ushered in. 
2). Probability/Desirability 
This Scenario is desirable but deemed 
less probable to happen mainly on account of the RAM/SFP/YOU 
intransigent position. Therefore, herein lies the greatest 
challenge to the government negotiators; how can they strike 
a happy compromise that can be mutually acceptable to both 
sides, a compromise that is constitutional viable, gives 
justice to all yet adequately provided with safeguards against 
the ascendancy of the RAM/SFP/YOU through illegal means. 
3) . Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action 
During the post-negotiation period 
(Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will: 
a). Abandon its military 
"adventurisms" and allow its members/followers to become 
peaceful, law-abiding, productive citizens; and 
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b). Join the political arena to 
further espouse their views and allow interested members file 
their respective candidacies in any elective positions in 
government. 
4). Recommended Government Moves 
a) . Abide by the provisions of the 
agreement. 
b) . Adopt a policy of accomodation to 
deserving military rebels who opt to be back in the military 
service. 
c). Expedite the processing of 
military rebels who took advantage of the amnesty program. 
d). In line with the true spirit of 
national reconciliation and unity, start in earnest the 
forging of new beginnings that will usher in national 
reconstruction. 
The four scenarios discussed above are the alternative 
results expected to evolve from the peace process. It is 
possible, however, that unexpected factors may crop up during 
the peace process and a variant of any of the four scenarios 
herein presented may result. Such variant is not expected to 
be a radical departure from the original scenario, hence, the 
anticipated RAM/SFP/YOU courses of action and the 
corresponding government countermoves as projected under said 
scenario will remain substantially valid although minor 
adjustments might be necessary. 
B.  RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 
All things considered, the above-cited scenarios are 
expected in the following descending order of probability of 
occurrence. 
89 
1. Scenario 2 
Negotiations come out with a "lame" agreement, a protocol 
or a joint declaration replete with civil but broad, ambiguous 
generalities. Process fails after negotiations with both sides 
charging each other with dealing in bad faith. This Scenario 
is considered most probable to happen because despite its 
intransigent position during the pre-negotiation period, the 
RAM/SFP/YOU will most probably try to sit down with the 
government panel to conduct peace talks which, irrespective of 
results, will afford them the broadest opportunity for 
sustained propaganda assault. 
The peace talks are expected to reach an impasse over 
some tough issues and both panels may seek face-saving device 
that will enable them to come out with a sense of 
accomplishment. This will result in the signing of a "lame" 
agreement, protocol or a joint declaration replete with broad 
and ambiguous generalities. This is one important lesson 
learned from the Tripoli Agreement between the Moro Mational 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine Government. 
2. Scenario 1 
Negotiations collapse or end up in a "stalemate" over 
some tough issues. Part of the RAM/SFP/YOU agenda is to 
exploit to the fullest the peace negotiations to ventilate its 
talking points, then scuttle the talks, putting the blame on 
the government. 
3. Scenario 4 
Peace talks end up with a mutually acceptable agreement; 
the objectives of the peace process are attained; military 
rebels problem end. Though highly desirable, this scenario is 
considered less probable to happen compared to the two 
preceding Scenarios above. Yet, both sides may somewhat strike 
a happy compromise that may lead to a mutually acceptable 
agreement especially if the military rebels adhere to abandon 
their destabilizing threats and actions. 
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4.  Scenario 3 
Negotiations end up with a lopsided agreement allowing 
the RAM/SFP/YOU to share power in running the government. The 
arrangement is not expected to stand the political fallout it 
will create. 
This Scenario should not happen in the first place. 
However, this course of action may yet become probable and 
tolerable if the agreement to be signed will give the 
RAM/SFP/YOU constitutionally viable political concessions with 
full guarantee against the possible political ascendancy of 
the RAM/SFP/YOU throug illegal means. 
C.  PREFERENTIAL SCENARIOS: MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM 
In any negotiations, getting everything that a negotiator 
wants is an impossibility. When meeting on more or less equal 
terms with neither side dictating over the other from the 
position of an undisputedly overwhelming strength, negotiators 
are expected to assert their positions most tenaciously. They 
will hold their grounds to protect their respective interests 
unless they lean back a little to find mutually acceptable 
alternatives. 
In the case of the Philippine government, it must be 
accepted that the other side it is dealing with; the RAM 
/SFP/YOU, is still a major force to reckon with, encouraged 
and abetted by the prevailing social, economic and politico- 
military environments in the country. Hence, the need of 
flexibility in dealing with them on the bargaining table based 
on the following objectives: 
1. Maximum objective: attain just, lasting and meaningful 
peace, national reconciliation and unity. 
2. Minimum objective: attain moral and psychological 
victory irrespective of the negotiation results with 
adequate safeguards against RAM/SFP/YOU political 
ascendancy through illegal means. 
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Based on these considerations, the following are deemed 
preferential over the other Scenarios discussed above: 
1. First Preference: Scenario 4 
This Scenario which ends up in a mutually acceptable 
agreement is the best thing that could happen to the Filipino 
people, Although rated as least probable, it is nevertheless 
a most desirable turn of event that could bring the peace 
process to a successful conclusion. A just, lasting and 
meaningful peace will be restored with the attainment of 
national reconciliation and unity. 
2. Second Preference: Scenario 2 
Although devoid of any concrete result except for a face- 
saving "lame" agreement, protocol or joint communique replete 
with ambiguities and broad generalities, the Scenario is 
deemed more manageable and more tolerable than the remaining 
two other scenarios. It is neither a complete success nor a 
total failure, but it would leave a less inhospitable 
environment for future civil-military and psychological 
operations. If properly crafted, the arrangement will give the 
government better chances to effectively pursue its policy of 
attraction including the amnesty offer to the military rebels. 
The Scenario offers a fairly good chance for the 
government to attain at least the minimum objective of the 
peace process: to gain moral and psychological victory with 
adequate safeguards against unlawful ascendancy of the 
RAM/SFP/YOU. 
3. Third Preference: Scenario 1 
The third and least preferable is Scenario 1 where the 
formal peace talks will abruptly collapse or end in a 
stalemate mainly due to the RAM/SFP/YOU intransigent position. 
Although the Scenario will not yield the desired results, it 
will give the government the chance to expose the duplicity 
and self-serving intentions of the RAM/SFP/YOU. If properly 
handled, it will allow the government to take appropriate 
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handled, it will allow the government to take appropriate 
moves and countermoves to make the moral and psychological 




RAM'S  SUGGESTED PROGRAMS 
Talking Point No. 1.  The RAM/SFP/YOU suggests that a minimum 
program should include: 
a. Implementation and/or strengthening of the following 
fundamental policy changes in public administration and the 
consequent structural reforms these will require. 
1). Devolution leading to more people participation 
and more pro-people policies and/or decentralization of 
national government functions in the areas of socio-economic 
development and delivery of basic services along the matrix 
type or organization. 
2) . Reorganization of the Executive Branch of 
government by reducing the number of departments, offices and 
agencies through the merging of those with overlapping 
functions and responsibilities, abolition of offices where 
government intervention is neither necessary nor desirable and 
the devolution to local government units of selected services. 
3) . Reorientation of the policy formulation and 
decision making system particularly in the executive 
departments with decentralized functions from the present 
system of direct government regulation to one based on 
consensus building and coordination. 
4) . Reorientation of foreign policy to assert 
sovereignty and pursue vigorously international cooperation in 
economic and trade relations with other countries. 
5) . Insulation of the bureaucracy as well as the 
constitutional bodies from partisan politics by: 
a) . Requiring that all regular positions in all 
departments up to undersecretary levels and in all agencies up 
to Deputy Administrator shall be drawn from the civil service. 
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b). Removal of the power of the President to 
appoint heads of constitutional bodies by providing that such 
bodies elect their head themselves. 
6) . Gradual reduction of the bureaucracy consistent 
with the restructuring of the executive departments and 
offices and agencies over a period of five years through an 
attrition system which shall include an early retirement 
program; rescreening and requalification of personnel and 
retention only of the best qualified; dismissal of grafters, 
scalawags and non-performers. 
7). Revision of the Civil Service Law to include or 
improve provisions on the following: 
a). Review and revision of recruitment, 
selection and entry processes. 
b) . Review and revision of the attrition 
system. 
c) . Review and revision of the grievance system 
to include provisions on the right of civil servants to freely 
organize unions. 
8).  Professionalization of the civil service 
through: 
a). Improvement to access to higher education 
and in-service training. 
b). Rationalization of the wage structure for 
public servants to include increase in salaries and benefits 
for those in the lower levels, prescribing limits on 
allowances and benefits for those in the higher levels and 
improvement of non-wage benefits to include subsidize housing, 
health, education and income tax exemption for public servants 
with net incomes equal to or below the income poverty line to 
narrow the gap between salaries and perks of those in high 
level positions and those in the rank and file. 
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b. Eradication of graft and corruption in government. 
1) . The pursuit, prosecution and early resolution of 
all graft and corruption cases particularly the following: 
a). The "behest loans" and the "behest sales" 
to include not only the contracting parties but also those in 
government and the government financial institutions who 
facilitated, participated in attempted cover-up or otherwise 
took advantage of the circumstances of the behest loans/behest 
sales for personal benefits. 
b) . Corruption in government institutions, 
corporations and agencies to include the Central Bank, 
Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, 
Government Service Insurance System, Social Security System, 
National Food Authority, Philippine National Railways, 
Philippine Ports Authority, National Power Corpoartion, 
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes and others. 
c). Corruption in the revenue generating arms 
of government particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue and 
the Bureau of Customs and Presidential Commission on Good 
Government. 
2). Institution of systematic reform in: 
a). Administration of tax and duty laws. 
b) . The conduct of all government financial 
transactions. 
c). Government supplies and materials 
procurement. 
d). Construction and maintenance project 
implementation. 
3) . Revision and strict implementation of the 
Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Law and Code of Ethics for 
Public Servants to provide for increased penalties and 
facilitate detection and prosecution of grafters and 
non-performers in the service. 
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4). Improvement of the capability of the Office of 
the Ombudsman by upgrading staffing quantity and quality and 
providing for direct links with organic inspectorate 
capabilities at department level. 
c. Return to the fundamental values in public office. 
1) . Implementation of measures to emphasize that 
public office is a public trust. 
2). Bringing back morality in public service. 
3) . Government austerity and judicious use of 
resources. 
4). The strict observance of the separation of 
powers with the power of the purse to be strictly returned to 
congress. 
5). Respect for the rule of law in the conduct of 
government affairs. 
d. Delivery of basic services with government being able 
to at least give citizens a fair return on their taxes. 
1). Solution of the energy problem. 
2) . Improvement of the capability of local 
government units through financial support, technical 
assistance and training to deliver basic services and 
infrastructure particularly with respect to availability of 
potable water, primarily health services, garbage disposal, 
market and produce distribution facilities, protection of life 
and property, disaster relief and rehabilitation operation, 
and delivery of basic communications facilities. 
Talking Point No. 2.  The Movement submits a list of minimum 
imperatives to move towards the recommended directions: 
a. Democratization of elections. 
1) . An anti-dynasty law must be promulgated and 
strictly enforced. 
2). The party list system of representation should 
be actualized. 
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3) . Provisions on equal access to media time and 
facilities to include common posters and leaflets, joint 
public meetings and regulation of media ads should be 
institutionalized. 
4). Restudy and strict implementation of election 
expenditure limit provisions to include post-election expense 
audit should be accomplished. 
5). The absentee voting system and enfranchisement 
of the disabled and the illiterate must be institutionalized 
to further broaden the electoral base. 
b. Implementation of structural reforms. 
1) . Institute a reject-vote system through which the 
electorate may exercise a "none of the above" option and hence 
influence the selection process for candidates; with 
candidates being thus rejected in any election being subjected 
to sanctions such as a temporary ban from seeking public 
office through elections or appointment. 
2) . Reorganize and strengthen the Commission on 
Elections (COMELEC) to include the appointment to the 
Commission of qualified citizens with no known history of 
political partisan or connections with big business; cleansing 
on the rank and file and the upgrading of physical facilities 
to include a new and permanent building for the Commission 
with ample provisions for secure storage of election 
parphernalia and similar requirements for the efficient 
conduct of elections. 
c. Institution of safeguards and controls. 
1). Improve administration of the voters lists to 
include the purging and computerization of existing lists in 
close coordination with the accredited political parties, 
barangay officials, accredited watchdog organizations and the 
National Census and Statistics Office; and the continuing 
registration of all qualified voters as they reach the age of 
qualification. 
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2) . Institute more stringent safeguards in the 
sourcing, printing, packing, distribution, use, retrieval and 
final disposition of all election forms and paraphernalia 
through representation by all accredited political parties in 
all activities covering the above with the three largest 
political parties as determined from the preceding elections 
being given the right to furnish their own seals and/or 
security provisions for certificates of canvass and other 
electoral forms and paraphernalia for the purpose. 
3) . Institute and strictly implement fixed time 
limits for the completion of electoral protests and cases of 
violations of electoral laws, with punitive provisions to be 
provided against persons or groups which may be found 
responsible for causing unwarranted delays. 
4). Strictly guarantee the neutrality of government 
personnel and instrumentalities particularly with respect to 
the clear and enforceable assurance of non-partisan use of 
government funds, facilities and equipment during the election 
period. The misuse of government funds in the last elections 
particularly thr National Reconciliation and Development 
Project (NRDP) funds should be vigorously investigated and 
guilty parties prosecuted. 
5). Announcements on all election results at 
whatever stage of polling shall only be by COMELEC. 
Talking Point No. 3. The RAM/SFP/YOU avers that an integrated 
national development plan shall include: 
a. Adoption of nationalist economic policies and programs 
particularly in the areas of: 
1). Fiscal and monetary policies: 
a) . The review and reorientation of the debt 
management program to include the designation of a full time 
debt management team composed of personnel who are not 
beholden to domestic and international banking interests and 
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imbued with economic nationalism to aggressively pursue 
restructuring of the commercial bank portion of our national 
debt; relief, condonation or innovetive means of retiring 
government to government debt; and to review, correct, and 
stop the treachery behind the debt buy back and debt to equity 
swaps engineered by local financial moguls and the banking 
system. 
b). Reform the financial system with emphasis 
on the reorientation of the role of the government financial 
institutions in development lending and the elimination of 
banking cartels with the primary objective of easing credit 
and encouraging capital formation. The interest rate spreads 
allowed banks should be reveiewed to close the gap between 
lending rates and interest on savings. Anti-trust legislation 
and other measures to eliminate banking malpractices should 
also be enacted. 
c). The adoption of development budgeting and 
austerity by the public sector to be complemented by a review 
of taxation to make it more progressive and make collection 
more efficient. 
d) . The arrest of capital flight and the 
repatriation and/or recovery of capital stashed here and 
abroad through an amnesty program. 
e). Abandon the floating exchange rate, impose 
foreign contols and peg the exchange rate to a vel , say of 
P30.00 to $1.00. 
2). Investment policies. 
a). Foreign investments shall be allowed only 
in selected areas as specified in the economic blueprint and 
shall be fully capitalized and sourced from the international 
market, given reasonable profit repatriation allowances and 
required to effect real technology transfer at a specified 
time frame. 
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b) . The roles of government and the private 
sector is fueling economic growth must be rationalized to 
eliminate destructive competition for resources, eliminate 
monopolies and cartels in strategic and essential industries 
i.e. communications, oil,electric power. The privatization 
program shall be reviewed so that strategic industries and 
those imbued with public interest should not be privatized and 
privatization schemes of other industries are not turned into 
"sweatheart" deals. 
3). Industrial policies. 
a) . Concentration should be on accelerated 
development of basic industries and infrastructure to produce 
our basic needs, produce capital goods and tools, benefit 
local consumers and generally provide a sound base for 
industrial expansion. 
b). Centrally planned dispersal of industries 
such as rural development and the use of desinated industrial 
estates shall be encouraged and implemented through providing 
government technical assistance, tax breaks and other 
incentives for small and medium sxcale industries. Industrial 
estates use by foreign investors shall only be in areas as 
specified above. 
4). Commerce and Trade policies. 
a) . Import liberalization should be reviewed to 
stop imports of non-essentials, encourage import substitution, 
protect deserving local industries, provide access to better 
technology and ensure benefits for consumers. Istead, import 
controls hand-in-hand withn foreign exchange controls should 
be imposed. 
b) . The foreign stranglehold of domestic trade 
particularly on staples and local produce for export such as 
coffee and coconut products must be broken to allow primary 
producers fair price for their products. 
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c). The develoment of export markets be 
restudied. Primary considerations in the development of 
products for export are the development of processed goods 
from local raw materials for export rather than products of 
low added value for which we also import raw materials and 
whose markets are beyond our control; diversification of 
products and markets to move away from dependence on too few 
trading partners and the resultant manipulation of price and 
quantity; and the exploitation of other synergies in export 
marketing such as mandatory use of Philippine carriers and 
other services for export trade. 
d) . Barter and counter-trade as modes of 
international trade particularly for government purchases and 
import of capital goods should be given added official 
encouragement and acceptance. 
5). Agricultural and natural resource policies. 
a). The priority tasjs in agriculture are to 
implement genuine agrarian reform and the attainment of 
self-sufficiency in basic food products and farming inputs 
through improved technology and productivity to raise rural 
incomes as a major requirements for industrial development. 
b) . The exclusive right of Filipinos to exploit 
the national patrimony must be held inviolable and given added 
government assistance and protection. Land use, mining, 
mineral exploitation, fishery, utilization of forest and other 
natural resources to include those in our exclusive economic 
zone to include in-country processing of the products from 
these shall be aggressively pushed through provision of 
financial and technical assistance. 
c). Environmental protection programs shall be 
balanced with the requirements of development; however, the 
maintenance of ecological systems in areas already designated 
as natural preserves and pollution control in urban areas; 
water and marine resource shall never be compromised. 
103 
6). Services and Technology policies. 
a) . Government support to local innovativeness 
and ingenuity must be improved with particular encouragement 
for adaptive technology for technologies where basic research 
and development is already well developed abroad, and for 
applied and theoretical science and research on areas unique 
to our country and for which productive returns can be 
achieved effectively such as in the areas of herbal and 
traditional medicine, agronomy and plant breeding. 
b). The local services sector should be 
improved by providing government technical assistance and 
skills training. 
7). Cooperativism. 
a). Cooperativism in agriculture and in small 
and medium scale industries should be pursued with government 
encouragement and support particularly in forms of 
facilitating access to credit, technology and market 
development. 
b) . Additional incentives for cooperatives must 
be provided by law. 
Talking Point No. 4. The proposed minimum program towards the 
attainment of social justice is as follows: 
a. The poor shall be the primary beneficiaries of social 
amelioration programs and basic services particularly those 
which will enhance living standards and the opportunities for 
advancement through their honest efforts. 
1) . Agrarian reform must be actualized to ensure 
that productive elements of the agricultural sector are given 
genuine liberation and be the nucleus for rural development. 
2). Government health programs shall give priority 
to generally accessible primary health care, responsible 
parenthood, basic sanitation and nutrition with primary 
emphasis on eliminating infant mortality and malnutrition and 
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the provision of socially priced health services and 
medicines. 
3) . Quality and free primary and secondary education 
in public schools should be afforded all our citizens. 
Secondary and tertiary education should be reoriented towards 
tailoring the output of our school systems to the human 
resource requirements of socio-economic development. Physical 
facilities and the quality of instruction should be improved 
and the curriculum in all levels of education should give 
renewed emphasis on civics, the inculcation of proper values 
and attitudes. Quality education means, the turn-out of 
critical minds, technical competence and the transference of 
positive values in lieu of reproducing and reinforcing the old 
orthodoxies which have largely perpetuated the structures of 
dominance of the elite. 
4) . Social amelioration programs should be 
administered as a package of incentives rather than as dole 
outs. Shelter and livelihood opportunities shall be made 
available only to those who are willing to work for these. Tax 
breaks and other benefits can be extended to the working poor. 
b. Labor's share in the fruits of development should be 
improved. 
1) . Wage legislation should be limited to selling 
the realistic basic minimum wages to be the standard which 
employers must pay on an industry and on a regional basis. On 
top of the prescribed basic minimum wages, other benefits and 
opportunities to include profit-sharing, equity participation, 
non-wage benefits such as food and housing sudsidies, health 
care and other programs may be attained by encouraging and 
protecting true unionism in which laborers themselves are the 
active forces. 
2). Legislation on the improvements of the judicial 
and quasi-judicial settlement of labor cases and labor 
problems must be promulgated to allow their speedy resolution. 
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3) . Labor productivity must be enhanced by requiring 
employers to provide in-service training, skills enhancement 
nd educational programs. 
4) . The labor of labor exportation should be reviwed 
and reformed. Only professions and occupations in which we 
have excess manpower and those for which overseas employment 
will result in upgrading of technical knowledge and skills of 
our workers should be allowed. Recruitment, mobilization, 
placement and contract administration should be turned over to 
complete government control to avail of the advantages of 
government to government transactions, afford maximum 
protection to our workers and protect the labor pool from 
unwarranted exploitation. In any case, the export of skilled 
labor and professionals should be phased out as the national 
econmy attains the capability to absorb the growing labor 
force. 
c. The criminal justice system should be overhauled and 
reformed. 
1) . The judicial system should be reformed to remove 
inefficient and corrupt elements, speed up the implementation 
of justice and ensure equal application of the law to poor and 
rich alike. The process of litigation of simple cases can be 
made faster by provision of a system of people's court in 
which litigants need not be representaed by counsel but are 
allowed to prosecute or defend their own cases. A system of 
continuous trial for criminal cases should be implemented . 
Government should improve the provision of quality free legal 
aid to indigent litigants. 
2) . The prosecution arm should also be reformed 
through improvement of physical facilities and the strict 
adherence to a code of ethics. 
3). Law enforcement must be improved and enhanced. 
The organizational reform and professionalization of the 
police agencies must be given priority consideration 
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particularly in the areas devolving to local government units 
the responsibility for community peace and order. Improvement 
of police to population ratios, improvement of police 
capabilities, and service attitudes and values should be 
attended to. The top priority should be the removal of misfits 
and scalawags from the law enforcement agencies and the 
provision of laws increasing penalties for law enforcers 
protecting or participating in criminal activities. 
4). Penology should give priority attention to the 
improvement of jail conditions nationwide. The implementation 
of reform and rehabilitation programs can only prosper if 
penal conditions are conducive and prisoners are afforded the 
minimum essentials of human existence. 
5). Community participation in the criminal justice 
system must also positively be addressed. Citizen access to 
police and legal services must be improved. The witness 
protection program and other measures to improve citizen 
participation must be given full support. 
6). The major effort to combat criminality must be 
on the elimination of organized crime particularly drug 
trafficking, carnapping and kidnapping; and the protection of 
the lives and property as a minimum. 
d. Programs to enhance and promote human dignity and 
well-being must follow the fundamental policies which are 
consistent with the requirements of national unity and 
development. 
1) . The protection of human rights shall be the 
primary concern of the state. The Human Rights Commission 
(HRC) must be given the prosecutory powers and improved 
investigation capability. 
2) . Equalization of employment opportunities and 
removal os discriminatory practices with respect to property 
and individual rights of women shall be given added emphasis 
in law and in practice. The protection of women and children 
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from domestic violence and exploitation in all aspects of 
national life shall also be pursued vigorously. 
3). Cultural minorities and indigenous communities 
must be given all opportunities to be fully integrated into 
the national mainstream while ensuring the retention of the 
positive aspects of indigenous cultures. The question on 
ancestral lands must be finally settled taking into account a 
balance between the preservation of the right to life, liberty 
and happiness of these Filipinos and the requirements of 
national development. 
4). Comprehensive programs to address the problems 
of mendicancy, street children, drug abuse, prostitution and 
abandonment of the aged and the handicapped should be 
formulated and implemented. These shall include the provision 
of food, clothing and shelter together with programs to 
rehabilitate these victims of society and return as many of 
them as is possible to productive life. 
5). The preservation and enhancement of indigenous 
culture must be given renewed emphasis in national life. The 
vehicles for propagation of culture and art must be reoriented 
to gear these towards faster attainment of national identity 
and for these to consciously contribute towards the 
realization of national aspirations. Use of domestic media and 
the global information networks inshaping the values of our 
young shall be monitored to ensure insulation of young minds 
from invidious propaganda and questionable values. 
Talking Point No. 5. RAM/SFP/YOU's minimum program therefore 
seeks to address the stated concerns. If we do indeed need a 
military, then it must be one which conforms with our 
aspirations as a people and one which we can support and 
identify with, to obtain such miliatry establishment, we 
must: 
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a. Review, redirect and restructure national defense 
concepts, doctrines and organization as follows: 
1). Amend the National Defense Act  (CA Nr.I) 
particularly on: 
a) . National defense policy and organization so 
that this will be more responsive to current and future needs 
given the changing domestic and international security milieu. 
b). Eliminate or modify provisions which have 
provided institutional sources of disaffection in the military 
such as those on rules and procedures on promotion; 
distinctions between regular and reserve components while in 
the active service; the relative security of tenure of 
enlisted personnel in the regular force; personnel 
administration policies and procedures relative to 
recruitment, training, assignments and separation from the 
service; command relationship; and the decision making process 
in the defense-military organization. 
c) . Reconcile provisions with the National 
Service Law and other new laws and issuances such as the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) Law and the new Revised 
Administrative Code. 
2) . Review and revision of national defense concepts 
and doctrines particularly on providing definitive guidance on 
military roles in: 
a) . External defense and security of our 
territorial areas, exclusive economic zone and contiguous 
areas. 
b). Civil defense opeartions, rescue, disaster 
and relief situations. 
c). Mobilization of industry and other sectors 
for defense such as in the area of defense manufacturing and 
procurement and the military participation in purely civilian 
enterprises. 
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d) . National development vis-a-vis civilian 
government agencies and the relation of these to internal 
stability and security operations. 
3). Codification and rationalization of national 
defense and security laws by using the modified National 
Defense Act as the basic law and incorporating extant 
issuances such as those on the National Security Council and 
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and new 
legislation as will properly define crimes against national 
security. 
4}. Review and realignment of international defense 
posture through the review of bilateral and multilateral 
defense posture and realigning these to give substance to the 
ASEAN ideal of making the region a zone of peace, freedom and 
neutarlity and new realities. 
b. Restructuring and reorganization of the AFP. 
1) . Reconfiguration into a citizen army built around 
a relatively small standing modernized army as nucleus - 
"lean and mean" military organization tailored to existing 
needs with provisions for the elimination of para-military 
units, phased programs for modernization and attainment of 
external defense capability, and integration of elements of 
former rebel forces and people's militias in the organization. 
2) . Revision of Command and Staff Organization 
through adoption of the joint chiefs concept and elimination 
of multiple and top heavy supervending headquarters levels and 
the decentralization of operations control'and execution back 
to the primary tactical formations. 
3). Formulation and adoption of relevant doctrines 
to cover all areas of military activities. 
a). Continuing update/restudy of existing 
campaign strategies to make them more comprehensive and 
relevant. 
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b). Organizational and equippage doctrines to 
guide the completion of a rationalized table of organization 
and equipment and to provide the basis for modernization and 
weapons systems acquisition. 
c) . Come up with our own combat and tactical 
doctrines based on actual local situations and experiences, 
c. Professionalization of the Military. 
1) . Implement and/or modify constitutional 
provisions on insulation of the military from partisan 
politics and related provisions. 
2) . Undertake systematic reforms in key areas of 
military activity particularly: 
a). Personnel administration and management 
b) . Military Justice System to include revision 
of the Articles of War 
c). AFP financial mangement and service 
institutions  to include audit of existing  financial 
institutions and investments 
3). Eliminate graft and corruption particularly in 
graft ridden areas such as: 
a). The procurement system 
b). Construction, repair and maintenance 
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